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PRECEDENTIAL CASCADES:
AN APPRAISAL
ERIC TALLEY*

INTRODUCTION
About a half century ago, a handful of social scientists began to
formalize what was to become the analytical heart of neoclassical
economics.' Under the broad rubric of "general equilibrium theory," these
scholars demonstrated (in varying degrees of mathematical sophistication)

the longstanding intuition behind the so-called "invisible hand": that is, that
competitive markets could convert apparent disarray and fragmentation
into order and harmony.2 More explicitly, general equilibrium theory

demonstrated how a decentralized collection of self-interested individuals
could, through competitive market transactions, allocate scarce goods and
services in a socially efficient manner.3 An equally powerful corollary
attended this central insight: that the prices that emerge in such markets
* Associate Professor, University of Southern California Law School. Thanks to Scott Altman,
Jennifer Arlen, Ian Ayres, Antonio Bemardo, Erwin Chemerinsky, Marshall Cohen, David Cruz, Mark
Grady, Ariela Gross, Jack Hirshleifer, Peter Huang, Dan Klerman, Timur Kuran, Chris Leslie, Gillian
Lester, Susanne Lohmann, Tom Lyon, Paul Mahoney, Ed McCaffery, Nolan McCarty, Nancy Marder,
Michael Shapiro, Dan Simon, Michael Solimine, Jeff Stmad, Cass Sunstein, Ivo Welch, and workshop
participants at USC, UCLA, and Chicago-Kent law schools for helpful comments and discussions.
Thanks as well to Yonit Hassid, Cindy Janis, Edgar Park, and Kathy Zeiler for excellent research
assistance. All errors are mine.
1. See generally GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1959); J. R. HICKS, VALUE AND
CAPITAL (1946). PAUL SAMUElSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947); Kenneth J.
Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, 26 ECONOMETRICA 522

(1958).
2.

Although the basic intuitions were first established in ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS (1776), the general-equilibrium scholarship of the 1940s and 1950s was the first to formalize
it precisely.
3. This proposition has come to be known as the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. It is
closely related to the Second Theorem of Welfare Economies, which states (under certain conditions on
preferences) that any Pareto efficient allocation can be supported by a competitive equilibrium with
appropriate lump sum transfers. See HAL VARiAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 200-25 (1984).
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convey valuable public information about resource scarcity to individuals
possessing little more than "dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge. ' 4 By many accounts, these dual characteristics
of efficiency and information transmission constitute a legacy that is
central to much of modem economic thought.'
In light of this intellectual inheritance, it is hardly surprising that early
law and economics scholars entertained the possibility that the common
law could function in a manner similar to competitive markets, effecting
order from chaos. The specifics of their story would take a slightly
different form, of course. Judges and litigants would supplant firms and
consumers as the central economic actors; precedents and rights would
replace prices and quantities as the focal equilibrium outcomes. But the
underlying argument was otherwise similar-positing first that common
law precedent tends over time to converge to rules which are economically
efficient,6 and second that it does so in a decidedly nonorchestrated
fashion-obviating the up-front costs that constrain statutory promulgation
in favor of a less costly, learning-by-doing protocol.
On first glance, the market analogy has a number of appealing
characteristics. Indeed, judges share at least some attributes with actors in
a decentralized economy: They possess limited information about the
world; they pursue ends which need not coincide with broader social
objectives (however defined); and they often pursue their respective ends
independently rather than collectively. Moreover, just as prices affect
individual consumption, production, and investment decisions, so too can
legal rules constrain and shape individual choices. Buttressing these
similarities, early advocates of the market analogy identified some striking
examples within the common law in which we observe rules that seem (at
7
least roughly) to correspond with efficiency concerns.
4. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,528 (1945).
5. Even in so-called "New Keynesian" economics, for example, a number of theories abound in
which price is seen as a critical transmission device for information. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, The
Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 1-3 (1987)
(arguing that price may serve an important signal of quality).
6. See WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW
(1987); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 320-28 (1973); William Landes & Richard
Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J.LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985); Richard
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1979) [hereinafter Uses
and Abuses]; George Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: An EconomicApproach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1978); George Priest, The
Common Law Processand the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H.
Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
7. See generally Richard Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J.LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
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Nevertheless, among contemporary legal scholars, the analogy
between market behavior and legal evolution remains relatively tenuous.
Over the last twenty years, detractors of the efficiency hypothesis have
challenged its foundational premises from multiple perspectives. For
example, some have noted that judges (often by design) are more insulated
from the inefficient consequences of their decisions than are analogous
market participants. This added protection, in turn, affords them the
opportunity to pursue ends that need not be related systematically to
efficiency. 8 Others have registered even stronger criticisms, noting that
even ifcourts were predisposed towards efficiency concerns, there is no
guarantee that those who actually litigate important matters will constitute
an unbiased sample from the relevant population. Operating from such a
skewed sample, the argument goes, judges may stand little chance of
9
arriving at an efficient rule, even if they wanted to.
Recently, a number of scholars have posited a particularly novel
account of precedential evolution-one that poses an even greater
challenge to the efficiency thesis: the theory of "rational herding," often
called "information cascades." 10 Originating from simple models of
learning, cascade theory lends some interesting and provocative insights
about the relationship between individual rationality and group behavior.
In particular, it offers an account of why seemingly rational individuals,
when making (ostensibly) independent decisions, might repeatedly ignore
their own inclinations, preferring instead to emulate their predecessors.
More specifically, the cascades literature posits that strategic actors may
rationally prefer emulation, presuming (frequently incorrectly) that their
own information is unreliable measured against the stock of that revealed
from their predecessors' actions.1 1 Moreover, once an information cascade
8. See generally Robert Cooter & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Lewis A. Kormhauser, Some Notes on the
Logic of Legal Change, in THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE: ORIGINS 169 (D. Braybrooke ed., 1996);
George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977).
9. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. LJ.583, 584-85

(1992).
10. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 765 (1999) (arguing principally that public risk assessments ae subject to
informational, cognitive and reputational herding effects-what they define as "availability cascades"--

but positing that courts are not immune to similar phenomena). See also, e.g., Andrew Daughety &
Jennifer Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts
(Vanderbilt University School of Law working paper, 1998).
11. See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads,Fashion,
Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Abhijit V.
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begins, other conformity-preserving phenomena (such as reputational
concerns, 12 network externalities, 13 status quo biases, 14 informal pressures

to conform, 15 and social "entrepreneurs"
pathologies 16)

eager to exploit group

can amplify and entrench the initial herding effect. 17 In the

aggregate, serial decisions to follow the herd may lead to a form of group
stagnation, curtailing the learning process not only for the marginal actor,
but also for all who succeed her. Groups of actors caught within a cascade
are therefore prone to severe lapses in judgment, and one can never be

confident that the resulting trajectory of behavior-no matter how stablereflects a desirable social policy.

Although the first applications of the herding literature were to extralegal phenomena (such as popular fads, political revolutions and stock

market crashes), their relevance for the theory of common law evolution
are apparent. Indeed, on at least a descriptive level, legal precedents have

the makings of information cascades. Beginning as early as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, numerous legal scholars have maintained that the
formation of precedent is symptomatic of judicial learning. The argument
goes something like this: Once judges gain sufficient familiarity with a
subject matter-transmitted through successive holdings in "similarly
Baneiee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 (1992); Ivo Welch, Sequential Sales,
Learning,and Cascades,47 J. FIN. 695 (1992).
12. See generally David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990); Jeff Zwiebel, CorporateConservatismand Relative Compensation, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 1 (1995). See also TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF PRFERENCE FALSIFICATION 157-95, 289-309 (1995) (describing the interaction
between information cascades, reputation, and the resulting impulse to falsify one's own preferences).
13. See Michael Klausner, Corporations,Contracts,and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv.
757, 789-840 (1995) (discussing how "network externalities" in corporate contracts can make even
inefficient contractual conventions durable if a sufficiently large number of people utilize them). See
also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996) (detailing same). But see
Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects In Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998) (arguing that this
"lock-in" effect understates the value of stable precedent as a mechanism for certainty).
14. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contractual
DefaultRules, 83 CORNELLL. REv. 608 (1998).
15. See generally George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May
Be One Consequence,94 Q. J. ECON. 749 (1980).
16. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 723-28; Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. LJ.375 (1997).
17. Although these exacerbating effects all provide plausible rationales for the durability of herdlike behavior, they provide somewhat less satisfying accounts of the genesis of such phenomena.
Information cascades, on the other hand, provide such a theory, and are therefore of central importance
in assessing the ex ante danger posed by these alternative forms of herding behavior. I therefore
concentrate principally on information cascades in this Article.
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situated" cases-a binding rule may crystallize for all future cases, even if
the rule is an inefficient fit for such cases. In this sense, just as in an
information cascade, a series of like-minded holdings may transmit
information from preceding to succeeding judges-information that
eventually obviates the need for further inquiry.'8
If common law precedent is in fact a type of cascade, it would
represent the strongest refutation yet of the common law efficiency
hypothesis. Indeed, it would suggest that even if judges are predisposed
towards efficiency, and even if they do not face a biased selection of cases,
precedents might still frequently diverge from the most efficient legal rule.
Moreover, a theory of precedential herding would force us to rethink the
coherence of virtually any jurisprudential theory of precedent that
conceives of the common law as a mechanism for judicial learning-be it
economic or otherwise. If precedent represents a weak or impoverished
learning device, then a common law system of adjudication seems unlikely
to produce reliable results. More concretely, however, this account of
precedent (if true) would shed considerable light on why some legal
doctrines are created (or destroyed) at an extremely rapid pace. For
example, it might explain why solitary decisions such as Lochner v. New
York19 succeeded in sowing the seeds for a string of succeeding likeminded (and non-self-conscious) opinions, only to meet their demise when
their tenuous foundational underpinnings were finally exposed. On the
other hand, a herding theory of precedent might cause us to question the
wisdom of surviving doctrines that emanate from watershed cases such as
18.

Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous lectures on criminal and tort law probably sowed the seeds

for what was to become this "learning" account of the common law within the law and economics
literature. See OLiVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 39-129 (1881). Though Holmes did not
cast his account within the rhetoric of economic efficiency, there is a fairly close parallel. See id. at 5

("The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is
then understood to be convenient. .. "). Indeed, the Holmesian account is reflected in economic terms
by Richard Posner, who writes:
A system of decision according to precedent has an[] economizing property: It... enabl[es]
the parties to a case, and the tribunal also, to use information that has been generated (often at
considerable expense) in previous cases. If it has been held in 20 cases that an electric
crossing signal is a required (cost-justified) precaution at busy railroad crossings, the marginal

gain in knowledge of the relevant costs and values from incurring the expense of a trial in the
twenty-first case may be smaller than the expense. A rule of the common law emerges when
its factual premises have been so validated by repeated testing in litigation that traditional
expenditures on proof and argument would exceed the value of the additional knowledge, and

hence the less valuable will be adherence to precedent. The authority and information aspects
of decision according to precedent thus converge in suggesting that the practice will be
consistently followed only in highly stable societies.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 548 (4th ed. 1992) (emphasis added).
19. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Brown v. Board of Education,20 as we could no longer be sure that their
durability continues to reflect sound reasoning or historical path
dependence.
In this Article, I endeavor to evaluate whether a cascade theory of
precedent represents a cogent description of legal evolution, focusing
principally on information cascades.2 1 My conclusions fall far short of an
endorsement. While it is certainly possible for precedent to manifest some
cascade-like characteristics, the necessary conditions for such phenomena
to occur appear somewhat implausible. In particular, many long-standing
institutional practices within the judiciary-such as long judicial tenures,
written opinions, and the hierarchical appeals processes-tend to reduce
the likelihood of a "bad" precedential cascade. Moreover, it is extremely
difficult (and perhaps impossible) to verify whether observed judicial
conformity is the byproduct of a cascade or of some omitted third factor
that commonly affects all judges. At the same time, however, a cascade
theory of precedent-even if empirically implausible-may still hold
relevance for legal scholars: for not only might concerns over cascades help
justify many of the existing institutional features within the judiciary, but
they might also provide some limited counsel as to how judicial institutions
may be designed and utilized more effectively.22 Moreover, an awareness
of herding phenomena may help judges identify when a population
prescribed by some legal rule may itself be prone to problematic herding
behavior which a prudent judicial response might ameliorate.
I develop my argument in four parts. Part I discusses the theoretical
possibility that precedent may constitute a cascade. By analyzing a stylized
model of adjudication, in which a sequence of judges each rule on a
sequence of similarly-situated cases, I demonstrate how the possibility of a
"precedential cascade" might emerge if at any point in time the relevant
case history becomes sufficiently monolithic. Moreover, the resulting
precedent need not coincide, ironically, with the underlying normative
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. See note 17, supra, for the justification of this focus. I shall nonetheless return to the
alternative sources ofjudicial conformism at Part IV.C infra.

22.

For example, Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton have advocated a case selection theory of

certiori for the Supreme Court that hinges on (among other things) the presence of inter-jurisdictional
conflict on central federal or constitutional issues (either among federal circuits or state courts
adjudicating federal claims). See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME
COURT'S RoLE 41-70 (1986). Conversely, Estreicher and Sexton would tend to label as "improvident"
those grants of certiori in which there was little inter-jurisdictional disagreement. See id. If one were
mindful of the possibility of cascades, however, prudent case selection policy might cut in exactly the
opposite direction. See Part IV.C infra.
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goals of the judges creating it, thereby exposing the principal theoretical
danger of information cascades. Part II discusses the more practical
question of whether such herding behavior is a plausible positive account
of law. Here my answer is somewhat more critical. I consider six
necessary conditions for precedential cascades to occur: rule-boundedness,
decisional opacity, judicial homogeneity, flat hierarchies, short judicial
tenure, and population stationarity. I argue that not only is each of these
preconditions far from ubiquitous, but that their confluence is likely to be
especially rare, as a number of them are largely precluded by current
institutional features of the judicial system. Part I highlights my
plausibility concerns by exploring possible empirical verification
techniques to determine whether legal cascades exist in at least some
circumstances. My conclusions here are perhaps the most skeptical. For
even if precedential cascades seemed plausible on a priori grounds, it is
difficult and likely impossible to test for their existence against any number
of plausible alternative hypotheses. 23 Finally, Part IV attempts to add some
perspective to the foregoing arguments, discussing the viability of noninformation-based accounts of precedential cascades, and arguing that
however constituted, cascade theory may still shed considerable light on
the institutional value of institutions such as written opinions, life tenure,
the appeals process, and the like. A technical Appendix follows the
conclusion of this Article for those interested in the formal development of
the intuitions presented in the text.
I.

ARE PRECEDENTIAL CASCADES POSSIBLE?

Perhaps the first requisite step in evaluating the viability of a cascade
theory of precedent is to understand precisely what an informational
cascade is, and how one might emerge within a jurisprudential
environment.
The discussion below attempts to provide such an
understanding by exploring a simple numerical model of adjudication, in
which a series of like-minded judges sequentially rule on a series of
similarly-situated cases.24 To conform with the cascade framework, the
judges are presumed rational, but incompletely informed about the world,
and thus may use the holdings of their predecessors in action to inform
23. It is important to note, of course, that the current absence of empirical proof of cascades falls
short of implying that cascades do not exist. It does, however, present significant problems for
proponents of cascade theory if they bear the academic burden of persuasion. See generally THOMAS
KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1970).
24. In what follows, I shall presume that this common goal is efficiency-oriented in nature.
However, a similar analysis would flow from any normative goal that hinges, at least in part, on
empirical learning among judges.
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their own beliefs. An analysis of this example yields two interesting
results. First, as judges learn information from previous holdings, they
may rationally begin to treat such holdings as binding, even if not formally
required to do so, and even if the case they actually hear suggests a contrary
outcome. Second, the incentive for judges to emulate one another may
stagnate the learning process, creating a precedent that fails to coincide
with the normative objectives of each judge.
Before proceeding with the model, a couple of caveats are in order.
First, the analysis that follows presumes throughout that there is no external
"rule" of binding precedent which compels judges to decide cases in a
manner identical to their predecessors in action. Indeed, cascade theory is
a positive account of group behavior, and thus it is inappropriate to assume
that (for various reasons outside the model) such precedent is binding.
Rather, the ultimate question of interest here is under what circumstances
will judges rationallychoose to emulate predecessors, even if not otherwise
compelled to do so. To be sure, there are many other positive theories of
precedent, but they are immaterial for purposes of understanding the
account of precedent as a cascade.
Second, as with any model, the analysis below is a simplified
description of the world, designed to expose the fundamental reasons why
an information cascade might emerge. It is therefore important to
distinguish between the model's simplifying assumptions (that is, those that
make the analysis more tractable without altering any qualitative results)
and criticalassumptions (that is, those that do both). Indeed, a subsequent
Part of this Article highlights six critical assumptions of herding models,
and argues that their confluence in practice may be extremely
implausible.25
A. A BASIC FRAMEWORK

Consider a single jurisdiction with a single court in which legal rules
evolve from generation to succeeding generation. In each generation (or
period), the jurisdiction appoints a presiding judge who is a sophisticated,
27
rational Bayesian, 26 motivated solely by economic efficiency concerns.
25. See Part II infra
26. The descriptive term "Bayesian" roughly asserts that judges use available information to
update and refine their beliefs about the world. In the context of this Article, judges use past and

current cases to hone beliefs about the composition of the population in which they must regulate
through choice of a legal rule.
The process of updating follows what is known as "Bayes' rule."

The rule states that the

probability of an event A occurring, conditional on knowing that some other event B has occurred (or in
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The tenure of each judge lasts exactly one period, at which time the judge
retires and is replaced by a similarly sophisticated, rational, Bayesian, and
efficiency-minded successor. Denote the series of judges as time passes by
J1, J2, J., and so on.
The principal task for each succeeding judge (or J1) is to announce a
legal rule that shall govern a given class of cases in the jurisdiction during
the coming period.2 8 To make things a bit more concrete, I will borrow a
classic "least-cost risk avoider" account from the law and economics
literature on accidents. Suppose that each succeeding judge must announce
a rule to govern some potentially injurious activity, whose possible harm to

victims is high (for example, $1 million). It is not particularly important
what the activity is, other than to allow for either the potential injurer or the

potential victim to engage in harm-avoiding investments. 29 The judge must
decide between two potential legal rules. Under the first (the "pro-victim"
rule), potential injurers are strictly liable for injuries that occur as the result
of an accident.30 Under the second (the "pro-injurer" rule), the risk of
accident falls wholly on potential victims of the harmful activity. (For
shorthand reference in what follows, I shall at times denote the rule
short hand, Pr{AIB)) can be derived from a combination of the respective "base rate" probabilities of A
and B (or Pr{A) and Pr{B}) and the "reverse conditional" probability that B occurs, conditional on
knowing that A has occurred (or Pr{BIA}). Explicitly, these four probabilities are related to one
another according to the following formula:
PrfB IAJ .PrfAJ
PrfA /BJ=

Pr{tB J

Thus, for example, suppose that one were attempting to use the outcome of a diagnostic test to
infer whether an individual was carrying a deadly virus. And suppose further that when administered to
people who are known to have the virus, the test yields a positive result 50% of the time. Moreover,
among the general population, the test yields a positive result 25% of the time, and 10% of the general
population carries the virus. Using Bayes' rule, it is possible to calculate the probability that an
individual who has tested positive also carries the virus is equal to 20%.
27. As noted at note 24, supra, there is nothing critical about the assumption that judges are
motivated by efficiency. So long as judges share a common motivational goal whose prescriptions turn
(in part) on empirical learning, a cascade can occur-at least in theory.
28. For now, I do not attend to the question of what makes cases sufficiently similar to place
them within the same "class," assuming instead that such classifications are consistently apparent to all
successive judges. When judges differ as to what constitutes a "similarly-situated case," the dangers of
herding effects significantly decrease (a point to which I shall return in Part III of the Article).
29. One example of such an activity is a decision of whether to place a duty of care on elevator
manufacturers (who might avoid hazards by installing safety equipment on elevators) or leave potential
victims to bear the risk of harm (who might avoid harm by using the stairs instead of elevators).
30. A similar type of analysis is possible if the applicable duty of care rule subjected the injurer
to a type of negligence standard. However, most of my analysis applies principally to rule-bound
adjudication, and indeed some form of rule boundedness is critically important for a precedential
cascade to emerge. See infra Part III.
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announced in each period by y,, such that a decision to favor the pro-victim
rule corresponds to setting y1=l, while the pro-injurer rule sets y1=O). Once
the rule is chosen, however, it will apply uniformly to all victim-injurer
pairs within the jurisdiction for that period.
Which legal rule applies is important from a social welfare standpoint,
because it identifies the ultimate risk bearer for the activity, who therefore
has the largest incentive to engage in precautionary measures to lower the
probability of an accident. 3 1 To concentrate on this element of the judge's
problem, assume that if neither party takes a precaution, then an injuryproducing accident is relatively likely, at say 25%. Conversely, should
eitherside exercise precaution, the likelihood of harmful accident falls very
close to (but slightly above) zero. 32 Precaution is costly, however, for both
potential injurers and potential victims, and as such, the determination of
the efficient rule is tantamount to placing the risk on the shoulders of the
33
"least-cost risk avoider."
Though this efficiency goal seems rather elementary, each judge's
task is complicated by the fact that the relevant population proscribed by
the legal rule is heterogeneous in nature. Explicitly, suppose that all
potential injurers face a cost of precaution of $5,000, while victims can
come in one of two flavors: "high-cost" victims, who must bear a relatively
large cost of $6,000 to avoid harm; and "low-cost" victims, who face a
relatively small avoidance cost of $4,000. In particular, suppose that the
fraction of high-cost victims within the jurisdictional population is denoted
34
by the variable 0,which (by definition) lies somewhere between 0 and 1.
Assume (for now) that this proportion (that is, 0)remains constant over
time. The respective victim types, avoidance costs, and population
fractions are represented in Table 1 below:

31.

As first noted by Calabresi, the normative efficiency goal of tort law is that the rules on

liability should be structured so as to minimize the sum of precaution, accident, and administration
costs. See GUiDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 347 (1988).
32. Consequently, some small fraction of victims suffer a harm despite precautions taken by
either or both sides, and thus some accidents occur and reach the court system in each period. If
precautions reduced the frequency of accidents to zero, then no litigation would occur and there would
be no story to tell about common law learning. To keep things simple, I have implicitly assumed here

that there are no complementarities in the decision to exercise care. Thus, all the benefits of exercising
care are realized if eitherof the parties takes precautions, and there is no added benefit from both sides
taking precautions. Nothing tums on this assumption.
33. CALABRESI, supranote 31.

34.

The corresponding fraction of low-cost parties is therefore denoted by (1-6), and of course

also lies somewhere between 0 and 1.
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TABLE 1. VICrIM TYPES, AVOIDANCE COSTS, AND POPULATION
FREQUENCY

Given the above framework, it is possible to consider the relative
efficiency of each type of legal rule. On the one hand, it is fairly clear that
the pro-victim rule (that is, y=l) will impose a social cost of $5,000 on

each potential injurer. Conversely, the pro-injurer rule (that is, y=O ) will
impose a cost of $4,000 for a (1-0) proportion of potential victims, and a
cost of $6,000 on the remaining e proportion. Hence, given the relative
proportion of victim costs (that is, 0), it is possible to specify the expected
costs that either legal rule imposes on a randomly selected victim-injurer
pair:

Exp. Social Costs

$4000 (1-0) + $6000 0
$5000

under "pro-injurer"rule
under "pro-victim" rule

As noted above, successive judges J, each attempt to minimize the
expression above during their tenure given their information (which is
equivalent to attempting to maximize efficiency).3 5
The heterogeneity of victims complicates matters, because the identity
of the least-cost risk avoider depends on whether a potential injurer is
paired with a high- or low-cost victim. If it is the former, then a pro-victim
rule is optimal; if it is the latter, then the opposite holds. Moreover,
heterogeneity implies that regardless of the judge's eventual opinion, 36 at
35. To see this, note that the only economic variable in this stylized model that turns on the legal
rule is who bears the cost of taking precautions. Under either y=O or y=1, one of the parties will take
precautions. Thus, while the social cost function in the text might also reflect the expected social cost
from harm, I exclude it since that cost would be borne no matter who bore the cost of precautions.
36. The assumption that one rule must apply to all parties is a critical one. In particular, it
excludes the possibility of choosing a "tailored" rule in which the victim bears the risk whenever the
victim's avoidance costs are $4,000, but the injurer bears the risk whenever the victim's avoidance costs
are $6,000. In some situations, the assumption of a uniform rule is probably warranted. In this case,
since the victim and injurer often cannot identify each other ex ante, it is impossible for the injurer to
tailor her own behavior in the presence of a "high cost" victim. In other words, since all victims are
observationally equivalent to injurers, at the time of the harm the duty must (for practical reasons)
extend uniformly, either to all victims or none.
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least some segment of prospective injurer-victim pairs will be
"mismatched" with the legal rule. Given this uncertainty, an efficiencyminded judge will attempt to minimize the costs of mismatches by
acquiring enough knowledge (or at least a basis for conjecture) to
determine which rule imposes the lowest social cost of risk avoidance on
37
average.
The judge, therefore, has an incentive (using any currently-available
information) to learn about the characteristics of the injurer-victim
population. As is often typical in hard cases, however, I assume that no
judge has good ex ante information about the true value of 0. Explicitly,
everyone's best initial guess about 0 is that it could lie anywhere between 0
and 1 with uniform probability. 38 It is this lack of knowledge that provides
a central reason to hear a case. Indeed, hearing a case affords each
successive judge an opportunity to gather more information about the
relevant population characteristics, and then to prescribe a rule that best
39
satisfies the judge's jurisdictional preferences during her tenure.
In order to capture this intuition, suppose that at the beginning of her
tenure, the judge hears exactly one case, drawn randomly from those in
which an accident has occurred.4 0 In so doing, the judge observes whether
the injurer was paired with a low- or high-cost victim. This observation
provides the judge with some information about the population, which she
may employ-along with information gleaned from previous holdings (if
any)-to update her belief about the proportion of low- to high-cost
victims. She then uses this updated belief to select the rule (y1) that
minimizes prospectively the expected costs of preventing accidents during
her tenure.4 1 Once she issues her holding, the judge's task is complete, and
Nevertheless, there may be a number of situations in which a more tailored rule is available. As I
shall argue in Part Ill, the possibility of a tailored rule may significantly mitigate the dangers of bad
information cascades through precedent.
37. See Hadfield, supra note 9, for a similar approach.

38.

In other words, I assume that the prior density function of Ois uniform on the unit interval.

39. Note that if 6 were known with certainty, the optimal legal rule would be y=O if 0 < 2 and
y=l if 0 > 'i If 6=, either y=O or y=l would be optimal. In what follows, I will assume a judge
whose beliefs about 6make her indifferent will simply randomize between the two rules.

40. Note that the case the judge hears is an unbiased "draw" from the population of potential
victims, in which a fraction (1-6) are of type 0 while the complementary fraction 0 are of type I. In
Part 11, I consider the effects of allowing judges to hear more than one case, which affects the outcome.
41. Because the judge is assumed motivated solely by efficiency concerns (rather than

compensatory goals), the fact that the harm has already occurred implies that her efficiency
considerations will be exclusively prospective in nature. A similar story could be told, however, if the
judge was motivated by distributional concerns ifshe were attempting to learn information about wealth
distributions among injurer-victim pairs.
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her announced rule governs the jurisdiction until the end of the period,
upon which the judge is replaced with a successor.

As noted above,42 one interesting consequence of viewing
adjudication as a source of judicial learning is that it lends itself to an
endogenous definition of "precedent." According to this conceptualization,
a prior holding has precedential weight when a later judge would choose
rationally to follow it even when the facts of the case before her alone
suggest the opposite outcome. Formally, in the context of this model, I
define a legal rule as precedent when it is common knowledge that
subsequent judges will not deviate from that rule regardless of what they
observe in the instant case 4 3

B. THE EMERGENCE OF A PRECEDENTIAL CASCADE
Having set up a basic framework, it is now possible to describe how a
legal precedent might emerge as judges sequentially learn about the
proscribed population of actors. As will become apparent, precedent (at
least within this example) is likely to arise cataclysmically, as judges
quickly gravitate to one of the two possible legal rules and tend to stay
there. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the established precedent
will correspond with each judge's efficiency concerns.
Let us begin with the first-period judge, J,, who hears her case having
no substantial prior information about the characteristics of the victim
population (that is, 0).4 With such limited information, other than the facts
she observes in the first case, the judge has very little on which to depend.
Thus the facts of the instant case may play a pivotal role in determining her
ultimate decision. Indeed, it is straightforward to demonstrate4 5 that the
first judge will favor the pro-victim rule (y,=l) whenever the first case
involves a high-cost victim, and a pro-injurer rule (y,=O) if the opposite is
true. To be sure, the first judge is not entirely confident in issuing a
holding based on such paltry knowledge; but from her perspective, limited
knowledge is better than none. Note, however, that the initial judge's
42.
43.

See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text.
This "predictive" element of precedent is consistent with the description often ascribed to

legal realists. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 153 (1986).

44.

Formally, it is necessary to specify a status quo ante that governs individual behavior even

prior to the first judge's opinion.

I shall assume (somewhat arbitrarily) that this status quo ante

corresponds to a "state of nature" in which injurers are never liable for harms they cause. Nothing turns
on this assumption.
45. See Appendix infra.
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holding is somewhat informative to her successors: for it signals precisely
the type of victim she has observed.
Let us now assume, for argument's sake, that the second-period judge,
J2, inherits a history in which the first judge has held for the pro-victim rule
(thus indicating that J, observed a high-cost victim). If J, also observes a
case involving a high-cost victim, it is clear that he will similarly hold for
the pro-victim rule (y,2=1). Indeed, in such a circumstance, J2 enjoys the
benefit of two proverbial draws from the urn, both of which have revealed
a high-cost victim. Since the odds of such an event occurring are much
higher when high-cost victims outnumber low-cost victims, the second
judge's observation will reinforce his confidence in the pro-victim rule. If,
on the other hand, J2 observes a case involving a low-cost victim, he will
realize that, combined with his inferences about the first judge's
observation, he faces conflicting data about the population. To be sure,
both of these data are valuable to the second judge. However, they jointly
constitute evidence that the population of high- and low-risk victims is
about equal, and he will be indifferent about whether to hold for the provictim or the pro-injurer rule. Because there may be good reasons for
taking either route, let us assume that if J2 faces such mixed signals, he will
randomize between the pro-victim and the pro-injurer rule.4 6 Nevertheless,
note that the first-period judge's holding does not have de facto compelling
power over the second-period judge. In other words, because it is still
possible that J2 will break from J,'s holding, no precedent has yet emerged.
This conclusion may change with the third judge. In particular,
suppose J, inherits a history in which both J, and J have favored a provictim rule (that is, y,=y 2 =l). What might she infer from this history?
Certainly, she can infer, as did J, that the first judge observed a case
involving a high-cost victim, or J, would have issued the opposite holding.
Moreover, our third-period judge can infer that her immediate predecessor,
J2, probably also observed a high-cost victim.4 7 This inference, as it turns
out, is a strong one. It is sufficiently strong, in fact, that even if J were to
hear a case involving a low-cost victim, the judge-after accounting for the
inferred revelations of her predecessors-would be disinclined to break
from the rule announced by J, and ratified by J,. This reasoning suggests
that if the holdings of first two judges happen to be the same, a
46.

This assumption is conventional in game theory, and can easily be relaxed.

47.

Given what J, reveals about 8, though, it is possible that J, observed a low-cost victim case

and randomized. However, given that J2 certainly observed a high-cost victim, this interpretation is less
likely than the alternative that 2 likewise observed another high-cost victim.
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precedential cascade will emerge, and J, will rationally choose to follow
that precedent, notwithstanding the facts of the case before her.
Although the discussion thus. far has been limited to the first three
judges, a precedential cascade may develop in later periods as well. For
example, should the first two judges issue contradictory opinions, then the
third-period judge will infer that her immediate predecessor must have
observed a case whose facts differed from the first-period judge's. Here,
the split precedent she inherits does not send a very strong signal to J, and
thus she will use the case before her to break the tie. In such a situation, a
cascade could still begin in a subsequent period. Indeed, it is possible to
demonstrate that as soon as the historical record of holdings becomes
sufficiently lopsided in favor of either the pro-injurer or pro-victim rules, a
precedential cascade will begin and will continue indefinitely.4
C. SIGNIFICANCE

Although the process by which cascades occur in this framework is
interesting in its own right, of greater import for current purposes is
whether an emerging precedent will bear any resemblance to the normative
goals of the judges who created it. Interestingly, the answer to this
question turns out to be "not necessarily." More precisely, once a
precedential cascade begins, the resulting legal rule may-with high
probability-vary from the efficient legal rule, even though each judge was
assumed to be efficiency-minded and rational.
In order to illustrate this point more concretely, suppose that the true
proportion of high-cost victims is equal to 40%, and thus the majority of
victims (that is, 60% of them) are the lowest-cost risk avoiders. Clearly,
the most efficient legal rule in this circumstance-at least on average-is
the pro-injurer rule, which places all the risk on the victim (regardless of
his individual avoidance cost). Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that a
stable precedent (when it obtains) will coincide with the most efficient rule.
Indeed, it is possible to specify a number of situations in which a cascade
emerges around the less efficient doctrine. For example, should the first
two judges both hold in favor of the relatively inefficient pro-victim rule (a
48. In particular, in this framework, a cascade will begin as soon as the number of pro-victim
holdings outnumbers the number of pro-injurer holdings by two (and vice-versa). See Appendix infra.
Moreover, it can be shown that in this sort of framework, a precedential cascade eventually emerges
with probability 1. See id.
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contingency that occurs 28% of the time4 9), a cascade will begin
50
immediately around that rule.
Figure 1 below illustrates the probability (measured from the ex ante
perspective) that the jurisdiction's prevailing rule will be the inefficient one
during each successive period. Note that during the initial periods, the
probability of an inefficient rule rapidly falls. But this seemingly
convergent process quickly slows in subsequent periods as the likelihood

that a cascade has already begun increases. In fact, the probability that the
jurisdiction adopts an inefficient rule never falls below 36.84%, no matter
how many periods one considers.
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FIGURE 1: ExA7zPROBABnrY OF AN INEFCmNT RULE EACH PERIOD

A few characteristics from this example bear emphasizing. First, it is
important to note that once a precedential cascade begins, there is nothing

within the internal framework of the model to snuff it out.

Indeed,

knowing that her predecessor has (rationally) decided to emulate her

predecessors, each succeeding judge finds herself in essentially the same
position as her predecessor, and would therefore also find it optimal to
49.

Explicitly, such a history would occur whenever the first judge sees a high.cost victim

(which happens with probability 0.4) and either (1) the second judge sees the same (probability 0.4); or

(2) the second judge observes a low-cost victim, randomized between the two rules, and ends up
selecting the pro-victim rule (probability 0.6x 0.5=03). The joint probability of the sequence, then, is
equal to (0.4) x (0.4 + 0.3)=0.28, or 28%.

50. Moreover, as noted above, if at any time after the first two periods pro-victim holdings
become sufficiently numerous, an inefficient cascade will occur at that time. See supra note 48.
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follow suit. In turn, so must all judges who follow. This point motivates
related observation: when a precedential cascade begins, the process of
judicial learning essentially stagnates. Indeed, consider the dilemma of J4,
who-for argument's sake-knows that her predecessor (J) was caught up
in a cascade. The fact that J3 chose to follow precedent signals nothing
about whether J3 actually observed a low- or high-cost plaintiff (indeed, J,
would have issued the same holding regardless of what she observed). By
logical implication, then, succeeding judges in a cascade can learn nothing
about the facts observed by their predecessors after J, and J2. The marginal
judge, no matter where she falls in the subsequent sequence of
decisionmakers, has no more confidence than did J, that the holding she
issues is the right one (even if it ultimately turns out to be).5 1
Second, note that despite its thin empirical basis, a stable precedential
cascade tends to emerge rather rapidly in this example. Indeed, in the
example depicted in Figure 1, there is approximately a 76% chance that a
stable precedent will have emerged by the third period, growing to 98% by
the seventh period. Nevertheless, whenever such a cascade starts, it will be
the wrong one nearly two-fifths of the time. Consequently, a rapid
convergence to a stable precedent reveals little about whether the resulting
rule corresponds to an efficient outcome, making it difficult for an outside
observer (such as a legislature, judge or legal scholar) to infer very much
from the fact that an initial holding is repeatedly affirmed. Equivalently,
one can never be sure that a stable rule has emerged because "its factual
premises have been.., validated by repeated testing,"5 2 or rather because
of a chance dependence on initial cases that turn out to be statistical
53
outliers.
Third, although an information cascade (once commenced) appears
stable, it is also rather brittle. Information cascades are extremely pathdependent on the outcomes of the first few cases. Consequently, if an
external shock from outside the above framework (caused by a public
disclosure of information, drift in population demographics, or the like)
51. Some commentators seem to overlook this point. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supranote 10,
at 722 ("In the course of an informational cascade, the perceived validity of a claim grows progressively
stronger with the number of apparent believers, and people's doubts weaken, possibly even
disappear.").

52.
53.

See Uses and Abuses, supranote 6.
A number of legal scholars have argued that the lack of path-dependence is a desideratum of

a common-law system. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE Op CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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were to occur, the cascade might easily "break," as its thin empirical basis
is finally exposed. 54 I take these issues up more explicitly in Part IV, infra.
Finally, while the example above illustrates how precedents may
diverge from efficiency goals, the implications of the herding approach-at
least in theory-need not be limited to a single motivational account of
judging. Indeed, suppose, for example, that judges were uninterested in
efficiency, but rather were motivated by a desire to remedy distributional

inequities within the population. Suppose further that in pursuit of this
goal, judges wished to manipulate the contours of tort law (such as the
calculation of damages) so as to effect transfers from the more well-off to
the less well-off in society. 55 Clearly, such equity-minded judges would be

interested in gleaning information about whether, in the main, victims or
injurers tended to be the most "well off" in a distributional sense. So long
as there is some heterogeneity in the population of cases (that is, some
cases involve tortfeasors who are better off than their victims, and some
involve the opposite), the argument developed above would seem to apply
with equal force. Early opinions might reflect the content of what those
judges observed-sending signals that effectively bind successors. Indeed,
as noted in the introduction, a cascade theory of precedent-if plausibleholds important implications for virtually any positive account of law
54. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that informational cascades do not occur in
a vacuum. Information cascades might well trigger other behavioral and cognitive pathologies, which
could reinforce conformism. Of particular note here is the "availability heuristic," which describes the
proclivity of individual decisionmakers to bias excessively their probabilistic assessments of some
random phenomenon in accordance with their ability to recall specific instances of that phenomenon
occurring. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10. See also TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS,
PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSiCATION 157-75 (1995) (elaborating
on this concept in greater detail); ANTHONY PRATKANIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, AGE OF PROPAGANDA:
THE EVERYDAY USE AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION 134-39 (1992) (examining the use of the same
advertisements repetitively); Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein & Thomas Toppino, Frequency and the
Conference of Referential Validity, 16 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 107, 107-12 (1977);
Marian Schwartz, Repetition and Rated Truth Value of Statements, 95 AM. J. PSYCH. 393, 393-407
(1982).
55. There is, of course, a lively debate (even within law and economics) about whether courts
should pursue anything other than efficiency goals. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667
(1994) (arguing that the pursuit of distributional goals should be the province of the tax system alone),
with Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instrumentsfor Equity: A More Equitable
View (USC Law School Working Paper No. 98-21, 1998) (visited October 2, 1999)
<http.//papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID--47400>
(arguing that Kaplow & Shavell's
argument depends on an unrealistic critical assumption). This debate, however, is not one that is
material to this Article.
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(efficiency-oriented or otherwise) that envisions some element of judicial
56
learning.
II. ARE PRECEDENTIAL CASCADES PLAUSIBLE?
To be sure, the theoretical possibility of precedential cascades poses some
unsettling questions for legal theory and doctrine. Just how alarming these
questions are, however, is a different matter-one that ultimately turns on
whether, all things considered, the conditions that give rise to herding
behavior, as described above, are a plausible description of the judicial
process. I now attend to this matter, focusing on six necessary conditions
for "bad" precedential cascades to occur5 7 : rule-boundedness, decisional
opacity, judicial homogeneity, short judicial tenures, flat hierarchies, and
population stationarity. Not only is each of these conditions far from
ubiquitous when viewed in isolation, but their mutual confluence is likely
to be especially rare. Moreover, a number of these conditions are
avoidable by the prudent design of a judicial system, manifestations of
58
which are already largely present within the current institutional regime.

A. RULE-BOUNDEDNESS
For a precedential cascade to occur, it is necessary that judges be
"rule-bound." In other words, judges must have a limited number of legal
rules to choose from. The example in Part I quite obviously involved rulebound behavior. Each judge was constrained to select from one of two
possible rules: strict liability (with compensatory damages), or no liability.
There was no middle ground. It is this constraint that created the chief
signaling problem for judges caught up in the cascade: were a judge to
observe litigants that did not "match" the inherited rule, she was not free to
fine-tune her holding, moving incrementally away from the status quo ante.
Instead, if she wanted to abandon existing precedent, she had to opt for a
dramatically opposed doctrine. In a cascade, a single contrary observation
is (by definition) unable to motivate a judge to take such drastic measures.
56.

See generally, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL

EXAMINATION OF RULE BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).

57. In the formal sense of the word, some of the conditions described below are not strictly
"necessary," as a cascade might still occur in their absence. Nevertheless, I include them below
because their absence would still render a cascade phenomenon particularly unlikely.
58. Although I will animate my discussion in this section using the explicit model developed in
Part I, supra, the conditions described below are for the most part generic to cascade models, and not
confined to any particulars of the example illustrated above.
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As a result, the information transmitted by a rule-bound judge to her
59
successors contains so much noise as to have no informational value.

Undoubtedly, rule-bound judging may be an accurate description of
some legal doctrines.60 Liability, for example, is often a binary outcome by

definition. 61 But in many practical situations, judges are not strictly rulebound. Indeed, judges frequently have tremendous freedom to issue
tailored holdings (by announcing standards rather than rules, for

example 62 ), which, in turn, may allow for more accurate inferences to be
made by judicial successors. Moreover, even when a judge is bound to a

binary choice on one issue, she may have a wider berth on others. For
instance, courts that decide on liability matters must often also announce
applicable burdens of proof, legal presumptions, and remedies. Courts
must also make determinations as to when the "facts" of a case are

63
sufficiently similar to those that the applicable rule is supposed to govern.

Each of these ancillary decisions may represent a valuable source of
59. In technical terms, the intuition is as follows: If each actor's action space were sufficiently
robust to allow for such incremental "fine tuning" by each successive judge, it would often be possible
to "invert" the strategy that turns observations into actions, inferring with certainty the signal the judge
must have seen. See generally In Ho Lee, On the Convergence of Informational Cascades, 61 J. ECON.
THEORY 395 (1993). One small caveat is applicable here: Cascades can conceivably occur when the
judges' choice set is continuous, but bounded, such as the real number line between 0 and 1. If the
extremes of such a choice set (i.e., 0 and 1) represent policy choices that judges might plausibly choose
in some certain states of the world, then there is a small probability that a cascade will occur at one of
those endpoints. See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 10. Nevertheless, such an environment still
implies that judges are effectively rule-bound at the boundaries of their action space.
60. Many pragmatists, such as Cass Sunstein, in fact, favor casuistry over rule-boundedness. See
CASS SuNSTEiN, LEGAL REASONING AND PoLrrlcAL CONFIcr 136-47, 191-96 (1995). On the other
hand, Sunstein admits the necessity of rules in many cases, including default (and other "privately
adaptable") rules within contracts and corporations. See id. at 154-58.
61. In the example from Part I, for instance, there was a logical reason for adjudication to be
more role-bound in its orientation. Because an injurer is frequently not in a position to determine
whether the potential victim is a low-cost risk avoider (i.e., potential victims are "observationally
equivalent" to one another), she cannot discern whether the victim is a high-cost or low-cost individual,
and this may give rise to a type of coordination failure where both or neither parties engage in
precautions. In many other applications, the assumption of rmle-boundedness seems perfectly natural as
well. For instance, one straightforward extension of this model deals with the formulation of the
appropriate "default roles" for contract law: i.e., roles for interpretation of a contract when the parties
have not specified their rights and duties in a particular situation. The normative theories about default
rules specify that because the set of contracting parties is observationally equivalent before writing their
contracts, an efficiency-minded court must try to formulate an optimal "off-the-rack" default. Much of
corporations law also centers on the creation and judicial interpretation of such "off-the-rack" default
roles. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 53.
62. For an explanation of the relatively greater nuances standards, see Louis Kaplow, Rules
versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992) (arguing that standards can be
decided ex post, and rules cannot).
63. Recall that in the example from Part II this classificatory decision was essentially assumed
away. See supranote 28.
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information to later judges, even if the instant judge is unwilling to
dislodge the liability rule. When incorporated into the example from Part I,
such arguments can undermine the likelihood of cascades, enabling each
judge to embed a credible signal of the facts she observed into a finelytuned legal opinion. Thus, if a theory of judicial herding is to have any
viability, it must be limited to cases in which judicial actors are rule-bound.
B. DECISIONAL OPACITY
Another necessary condition for cascades is that the communication
between actors be limited. For example, in stock market applications of
herding behavior, market participants are able to observe transactions only,
not the motivating rationales of the buyers and sellers.f a Similarly, a
precedential cascade implicitly assumes that succeeding judges are able to
observe only what rule predecessor courts have adopted-but not why they
have adopted it.65 On its face, such an assumption within a judicial system
is at least a stretch, and at most demonstrably false. Indeed, all appellate
level courts (and even some trial level courts) not only announce outcomes,
but they also provide written opinions describing both the facts of each
case and how they reached their conclusions. Most importantly, the ability
to write an opinion enables a judge who follows precedent in the face of
contrary facts to signal a reluctance to do so.
Allowing for written opinions would change the conclusions of the
example in Part I dramatically. Indeed, consider a third-period judge in the
earlier example who inherits a history of two pro-victim holdings, but who
observes a case in which the victim (rather than the injurer) is the low-cost
risk avoider. Clearly, this single observation may not be enough to induce
J, to break with precedent, but a written opinion would allow her both to
follow her predecessors' lead and to signal her ambivalence about doing
so. 66 Moreover, subsequent judges, in making inferences from existing
case law, would tend to pay greater attention to J3 's reasoning than her
holding (which they know to be uninformative). Consequently, the judicial
learning process would continue rather than stagnate after the third period.
64. See Lee, supra note 59, at 410.
65. See, e.g., Banerjee, supranote 11, at 798.
66. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting
the lack of theoretical and empirical support for the liquidated damages rule, but concluding: "however
this may be, we must be on guard to avoid importing our own ideas of sound public policy into an area
where our proper judicial role is more than usually deferential").

108
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Figure 2 demonstrates how the inclusion of such written opinions
would affect the likelihood of an inefficient cascade over the same interval
of time in Figure 1. As the Figure illustrates, when written opinions are

available, judicial learning will not stagnate as it did earlier. Indeed, if one
were to let this process continue indefinitely, the prevailing legal rule will
67
converge (with a probability of one) to the most efficient legal rule.
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FIGURE 2: EX ANTPROBABILITY OF INEFFICIENCY (WRrTTEN OPINIONs)

It is, of course, debatable whether written opinions are always

perfectly candid reflections of a judge's thoughts. Indeed, legal realists
first argued that judicial opinions are rarely sincere, reflecting little more
68
than stealthily-cloaked social theory in the garb of formal legal precepts.
67. One caveat to this argument deserves mention. In the example from the previous section, it
was assumed that the judge had no choice but to observe the facts of the case before her. When,
however, such observations are at the discretion of the judge (e.g., she can dismiss the case at a
relatively early stage), then ajudge caught in a cascade may rationally decline even to collect the instant
signal. See L. Smith & P. Sorenson, Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning (MIT Working
Paper, 1995) (on file with author).
68. See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935); CHARLES CLARK,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN WrTH THE LAND (2d ed. 1947) (noting that the
"touch and concern" requirement has devolved into little more than an instrument for randomness);
Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 812
(1935) (making a similar argument about personal jurisdiction doctrine); Max Radin, The Theory of
JudicialDecision: Or How Judges Think, I1 A.B.A. J. 357, 360 (1925). Karl Llewellyn's now-classic
article on judicial interpretation of statutes underscores this point, as Llewellyn notes some 28 separate
pairs of "canons of construction," each pair seeming to suggest opposite behavioral norms, such as the
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Moreover, recent "pragmatist" theory has even endorsed the idea of opaque
decisions. Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued (somewhat ironically)
that judges should be somewhat imprecise, confining the justificatory
components of their holdings to "low-level" principles that are consistent

with numerous normative theories of law.69 The rationale for such a
practice, apparently, is to arbitrate and construct a type of consensus or
"incompletely theorized agreement" between such competing meta-theories
(or at least a number of them). Doing so, the argument asserts, is the
principal means by which adjudication becomes viable as a type of social

ordering in a pluralistic world. 7° At the same time, however, such opacity
comes at a distinct cost, for it tends to increase the likelihood that a bad

cascade will occur.
Be that as it may, it seems unlikely that all (or even most) judicial

opinions are hopelessly opaque. Sole presiding judges need not build a
consensus among their counterparts (at least to reach an opinion), and they
can therefore afford to be relatively more candid. Moreover, even among
empaneled judges, the prospect of dissenting opinions, concurring
opinions, opinions that concur only in the judgment, and the like all

represent forms of information dissemination capable of obviating a future
canon "Every word and clause must be given effect," paired with its opposing canon, "If inadvertently
inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute, [a word] may be rejected as surplusage." Karl
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes
Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 401,404 (1950).
69. See CASS SuNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLmCAL CONFLICT 193-94 (1995). That
Sunstein has advanced this argument is somewhat surprising, given that he is one of the principal
contributors to the legal cascades literature, and a champion of institutional reforms that reduce the
likelihood of "bad" cascades. See Kuran & Sunstein, supranote 10, at 762 ("A major challenge for any
democratic system is to institute safeguards against harmful cascades.").
A related, though
conceptually distinct pragmatist account of opacity asserts that judges may adhere to precedent without
introspective analysis of the effects of the instant case as a means of avoiding distress and guilt over
issuing difficult holdings. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor,89 MICH. L. REv. 296, 305 (1990).
70. To be fair, most of Sunstein's argument is built around advocating opaque articulations of
normative goals rather than facts. But nonetheless, there may be facts in a case that, if used in an
opinion, expose the normative commitments of the opinion writer. In such situations, an incompletelytheorized agreement might necessitate the omission of such facts, and the creation of a potential
cascade. Consider, for instance, a judge who is attempting to build a consensus among other judges
whose respective normative allegiances are split between efficiency and distributional concerns. Our
judge may have access to a number of facts, including who is the lowest-cost risk avoider (a fact that is
critical to efficiency-minded concerns), and who, between the injurer and the victim, is the wealthiest (a
fact that is critical to distributional concerns). Sunstein's account, as I read it, suggests that this judge
may prefer to issue a relatively uniformative holding (e.g., "the injurer is liable because consideration of
justice tip in favor of liability") rather than one that reveals an allegiance to one particular meta-theory
or another (e.g., "the injurer is liable because she appeared to be the least-cost risk avoider"). By
omitting such implicit recitations of facts, this judge may be able to gamer support from judges who
pursue distinct (but in this case consequentially equivalent) norms.
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information cascade, even when a dispositive consensus has been struck.
Consequently, a viable theory of precedential cascades must also be limited
to situations where written opinions are sufficiently opaque.
C. JUDICIAL HOMOGENEITY

A third necessary condition for a cascade is that the motivational
objectives of all actors must be mutually shared and commonly known. In
the model from Part I, for instance, it was common knowledge that all
judges were identical, one-period efficiency maximizers, their only
difference being the order in which they decide cases. This motivational

homogeneity enabled later judges to make inferences about their
predecessors' observations based solely on the holdings in those cases. If
judges do not share a similar motivational "fabric," however, then it is
much more difficult to make such inferences. Referring back to the model
in Part I, suppose that the first two judges, J, and J, were interested solely

in efficiency, while the third-period judge, J, was interested solely in
distributional equity. Would a sequence of pro-victim holdings from J, and

J,/be sufficient to convince J, that she should simply follow suit? It seems
unlikely. Unless the identity of the low-cost risk avoider was sufficiently
correlated to the identity of the worst-off litigant, then the first two
holdings are of relatively little value to J, when she makes her decision.
Instead, she would place significantly greater decisional weight on the facts
71
revealed by the case before her, thereby breaking the possible cascade.
This dampening effect is even stronger when judges are unsure of each

other's motivations. Asymmetric information of this sort magnifies the
71. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10, appear to posit the opposite of this claim. See id. at 722
(noting that a "precondition of any cascade [is] heterogeneity in individual responsiveness to social
signals"). To be sure, individuals must act sequentially (rather than simultaneously) for a cascade to
form, but heterogeneity beyond sequential order of action is more likely to dampen (rather than
amplify) herd-like behavior. For instance, if individual judges were heterogeneous in their proclivity to
join the bandwagon, a cascade would tend to build slowly, as less responsive individuals slowly join the
bandwagon. However, were an apparent bandwagon effect to erupt in this fashion, it would be less
likely to constitute a problematic cascade. Indeed, less responsive individuals (by definition) have a
smaller proclivity to infer wisdom from their predecessors in action, and pay more attention to their
own private signals. In this sense, the fact that a relatively unresponsive individual joined the herd late
signals valuable new information to successors (unlike the stagnated learning that typifies information
cascades).
Nevertheless, heterogeneity may play an interesting role in reputational theories of judging.
Some herding theories, for instance, posit that individuals of different "skill levels" may prefer to
follow the crowd if they are concerned about being exposed as of low-quality. Jeff Zwiebel, in fact,
argues that in such situations, either the very talented or the very untalented actors may be willing to
break with the herd. See Zwiebel, supra note 12. Note, however, that even within this framework,
heterogeneity makes population-wide conventions less rather than more likely. See infra Part IV.C.
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incentive to place one's
own observation above the (imperfectly revealed)
72
observations of others.
D. SHORT JUDICIAL TENURES
Herding behavior-in a rather interesting twist of irony-bears a
striking resemblance to the so-called "tragedy of the commons." 73 Recall
that the tragedy of the commons occurs when self-interested shepherds,
disregarding the welfare of others, have inefficient incentives to over-graze
the commons, thereby imposing a negative externality on one another. A
similar form of externality infects an information cascade, though one that
exists over time rather than space. Cascades occur because individual
decisionmakers seek to maximize their own benefit by following the herd,
disregarding the welfare of future decisionmakers, who would benefit from
learning about predecessors' observations.
One oft-proposed solution to the tragedy of the commons is to vest
ownership of the commons in a single shepherd, who could control the rate
of grazing.74 Since the new owner must bear the full costs of over-grazing,
she will tend to internalize the externality, and-at least in theory-the
inefficiency will disappear. The analogous solution within information
cascades would be to allow a single actor to make decisions over numerous
periods. In the extreme case, if a repeat actor were infinitely-lived, she
could never be caught in a cascade, since she would have personal
75
recollection of the signals she observed in each period before.
As it turns out, common law judicial systems have an excellent device
for ensuring repeat play: long judicial tenures.7 6 All Article I judges have
life tenure, as do a number of state judges. The remainder frequently have
generous terms of office. Allowing judges to have long tenures enables
them to hear a number of similarly-situated cases, updating their beliefs
over time with each succeeding case. Consequently, long tenures (even if
not infinite) can mitigate the problem of herding behavior significantly. If,
72. Moreover, even in those situations where judges share common goals, a cascade need not
always emerge. If, for example, all judges were committed to a goal of dynamic rather than static
efficiency, then in each period a judge might be willing to ignore existing precedent and base his
holding solely on the facts before him. Although this approach "throws away" information that could
be useful today, it allows the instant judge to provide more data for tomorrow's judges.
73. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sa. 1243 (1968).

74.

See id. at 1245.

75.

Of course, it may still be possible for an infinitely-lived judge to bias her recollection of

previous cases in the direction of particularly note-worthy experiences. See infra Part I.C.
76.

Life tenure has a longstanding tradition within Anglo-American jurisprudence. See generally

Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and JudicialIndependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (1999).
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in the example from Part I, a single judge served for three periods rather
than one, then the probability of an efficient precedent eventually emerging
would increase from (approximately) 63% to 78%, and the corresponding
probability that an inefficient precedent would emerge decreases from 37%

to 22%.77 Thus, a theory of precedential cascade is far less compelling
when individual judges serve out long terms on the bench.
E. FLAT HIERARCHIES

Another important assumption made in the previous Section was that
the hierarchy of courts was relatively flat. In particular, within that
example there was only one court in each period, whose holding was not
subject to subsequent review by a higher court. Quite clearly, such flat
hierarchies are much more the exception than the rule within AngloAmerican jurisprudence. If one were to add a hierarchical judicial system
to the example from Part I, the dangers presented by cascade-like behavior
would almost certainly decline, for at least three reasons. First, the appeals
process itself is an institutional device that facilitates the pooling of
information, particularly when-as is not uncommon-appellate courts
hear numerous appeals simultaneously. By reviewing the composite
records of such cases, an appellate judge may be able to extract a more
informative signal than did lower court counterparts, breaking a destructive
77. Although not discussed in the text, one can replicate the beneficial effect of long tenures by
allowing judges access to information that goes beyond current or historical cases before the court, such
as statistical studies of industry practice or population base rates.
Interestingly, however, numerous procedural constraints in American courts force judges to
confine their opinions principally to precedent and the facts of the case before them. The most notable
of these are constitutional constraints, requiring, for instance, that courts may not exercise jurisdiction
unless necessary to resolve "cases" and "controversies." This noninvestigatory capacity of the court
suggests that courts are not active researchers by nature, but rather are passive adjudicators. They do
not conduct systematic studies to determine the effectiveness of the legal rules they promulgate, and in
fact often disavow such a role, claiming it (perhaps correctly) to be one that is more fit for a legislative
body. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("To
analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing concerns and the endless data ...the judgment
of the representatives of the [Congress] is required."). Additionally, the constitutional constraints under
the mootness, ripeness, and the political and administrative question doctrines prevent courts from
inquiring into cases that cease to be in dispute, are not yet in dispute, or are in some way beyond the
competence of a court as a passive actor. See 13 CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3532-34 (1984). Each of these

doctrines constrains the ability of a court to act in a capacity as a social policy researcher. Other
procedural doctrines, such as the relevancy rules of evidence may further impede a court's access to
large "samples" from which to learn. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
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information cascade if such an action is warranted.78 Second, appellatelevel judges may be more experienced, more skilled, and less timeconstrained on average relative to their trial-court counterparts. As such,
they may be able to filter out some of the observational noise that a trial
court would not be able to eliminate. Finally, the prospective threat of
reversal may induce lower courts to draft more comprehensive and precise
opinions, which in turn provides appellate-level judges with a more
complete record from which to synthesize such empirical information.
Viewed in this sense, then, the hierarchical structure of the judicial system
places an important check on the viability of runaway herding effects.
Although stacked hierarchies cannot completely circumvent cascade, such
structures almost certainly render them less likely to occur.
F. POPULATION STATIONARITY

Finally, for an information cascade to persist over time, there must not
be a significant element of "drift" in the underlying population
characteristics of interest. In the example from Part I, for instance, the
absence of drift implies that the population of injurers and victims-and in
particular the ratio of high-cost to low-cost victims-must remain relatively
constant over time. If it did not, then it would be difficult for late-moving
judges to learn much, if anything, about early judicial opinions. Indeed,
such opinions might have been statistically justifiable at the time, but not if
the relevant population has undergone considerable change.
It is important to note that the complete absence of drift is not
necessary for a cascade to form. Indeed, so long as the population changes
at a sufficiently slow rate, episodic cascades could emerge. However, such
cascades would be relatively less durable, breaking easily once the drift of
the population had out-paced the wisdom of early opinions. As such, a lack
of stationarity makes the prospect of precedential cascades less
troublesome.
78. Indeed, in their analysis of cascades, Daughety and Reinganum analyze a set of circuit court
cases in which a cascade may have occurred, but one that was nonetheless broken by the Supreme
Court. See Daughety and Reinganun, supra note 10, at4passim.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 73:87

Each of the above six conditions is necessary for a theory of
precedential cascades to be both viable and significant. None of them,
however, when viewed alone, is likely to be ubiquitous in practice. More
important, however, is the necessity that these conditions must occur
jointly, and not alternatively. Hence, if there is a subuniverse of cases in
which courts manifest a dangerous form of herding behavior, it is most
likely limited to those situations in which courts are rule-bound, and
judicial opinions are opaque, and judges are similarly motivated, and
judges serve short (or ephemeral) terms, and appeal is unlikely (or
unavailable), and population drift is relatively small. Perhaps such a
subuniverse of cases exists; but if it does, it seems unlikely to represent a
significant fraction of cases in most areas of litigation.
III. ARE PRECEDENTIAL CASCADES VERIFIABLE?
Although I have argued that informational herding is implausible as a
general account of judicial review, its contributions might still have
considerable value if appropriately limited to those situations where the
dangers of such phenomena appear significant. Indeed, if it were possible
to isolate a strand of legal doctrine swept up within a judicial cascade, it
might be possible to employ reform efforts either to break the cascade (if it
is a bad one) or validate it (if it is a good one).7 9 In substantive areas of law
where cascades are problematic, for example, we might place greater
requirements on written opinions, lengthen the tenure of judicial actors,
build steeper judicial hierarchies, or encourage other forms of public
information disclosure.
The practical implementability of such remedial efforts, however,
turns on whether one can detect the emergence of a precedential cascade in
specific legal contexts. Here it seems that two types of evidence might be
of some assistance. First (and preferably), one might rely on crosssectional and/or time-series data on the formation of precedent to help
detect when a cascade has emerged. In the absence of such statistical
proof, however, it might be possible to use anecdotal evidence to
demonstrate the existence of a herding phenomenon. Unfortunately,
neither of these approaches clearly demonstrates that an episode of
apparent group conformity stems from a cascade or some other, less
distressing explanation.
79.

See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 688.
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Consider first the task of attempting to infer a judicial herding episode
statistically, from aggregate cross-sectional or time-series data. Casual
observations from such data are in fact what motivated much of the initial
herding literature, including accounts of asset price bubbles, 80 corporate
conservatism,"1 bank runs, and political revolutions.8 2 Each of these
applications is typified by a trend that begins locally, is subject to rapid,
serial emulation by other agents who disregard their own private
information, and seems to hinge on one or two initial movers who appear to
trigger the cascade and its subsequent aggregate effects. Thus, one might
ask, can similar phenomena be detected in legal doctrine? If so, can the
quick spread of the doctrine be fairly interpreted as a precedential cascade?
Twentieth century American jurisprudence does not lack for rapidlyspreading doctrines. A particularly good example of such a trend is the
spread of the contract doctrine of unconscionability during the last forty
years.8 3 The doctrine, in its modem form at least, allows a party to void a
contractual term(s) if it appears to the court that the term(s) is manifestly
unfair (often called "substantive" unconscionability) and/or the term was
the result of a bargaining process that gave such a party no meaningful
choice (often called "procedural" unconscionability). 8' Although a number
of opinions dating as far back as the nineteenth century had invoked the
term "unconscionable" while refusing to enforce a contract on public
policy grounds, New Jersey was likely the first to adopt unconscionability
as a separate, generally-applicable doctrine in 1960.85 The doctrine soon
began to spread to other jurisdictions, many of which cited the early
movers in almost a cursory fashion.
80. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Rational Frenzies and Crashes, 102 J. POL.
ECON. 1 (1994).
81. See, e.g., Zwiebel, supranote 12.
82. See Susanne Lohmann, The Dynamics of Informational Cascades, 47 WORLD POL. 42

(1994).
83.

The diffusion of legal doctrines across states has itself spawned an entire literature that is

distinct from the informational herding literature. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum,
Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial
Doctrines,75 AM. POL. SC!. REV. 975 (1981) (analyzing the diffusion of various tort doctrines across

states).
84. Most opinions that invoke the doctrine involve facts that have both procedural and
substantive elements, and a strong showing of one tends to permit a weaker showing of the other. See
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 312 (3d ed. 1999). It is somewhat doubtful, however, that one
may utilize the doctrine in situations in which only one form of unconscionability is present. See id.
85. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). One of the first
articulations of the doctrine is in the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, drafted during the 1950s.

Though the U.C.C. constitutes compelling authority only for cases of goods, the adoption of the
doctrine described here was much broader than that, and applied U.C.C. § 2-302 by analogy to other
cases as well.
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The swiftness of the unconscionability trend was relatively dramatic,
though not simultaneously adopted, as depicted in Figure 3. In 1970, the
doctrine had been adopted by at most six states. By 1985, however, fortyone states had embraced some version of the doctrine completely. Since
then, the trend has obviously slowed, and by 1996 only five more states had
completely embraced the doctrine.86 Like other purported episodes of
86. Though the term "unconscionable" has made early and frequent appearances in contract law
cases, I confined my analysis to the adoption of the "modem" doctrine, in which courts recognized
unconscionability formally (combining procedural and substantive elements), The state-by-state
breakdown as of 1996 is follows: Ala.: Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala. Inc., 453 So. 2d 735 (1984);
Alaska: Iniman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498 (1962); Ariz.: Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of
Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210 (1981); Ark.: Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods Inc., 510 S.W.2d 555
(1974); Cal.: Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (1981); Colo.: Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370
(1981); Conn.: Hanm v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946 (1980); Del.: Tulowitzki v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 396
A.2d 956 (1978); Ha.: Yet to adopt; Ga.: R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co., Inc. v. Ferguson, 214 S.E.2d 360
(1975); Haw.: Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Construction, Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (1975); Idaho: Brooks
v. Terteling, 688 P.2d 1167 (1984); l.: Stea=s Sports Club, LTD v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226
(1983); Ind.: Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Iowa: C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (1975); Kan.: Steele v. J.I. Case Co., 419 P.2d 902 (1966); Ky.:
Yet to adopt; La.: Yet to adopt; Me.: Dairy Farm Leasing Co., v. Hartely, 395 A.2d 1135 (1978); Md.:
Williams v. Williams, 508 A.2d 985 (1986); Mass.: Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370
(1980); Mich.: Yet to adopt; Minn.: Yet to adopt; Miss.: Johnson v. Robinson, 351 So. 2d 1339 (1977);
Mo.: Bracey v. Monsanto Company, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 946 (1992); Mont.: All-States Leasing Co. v. Top
Hat Lounge, Inc., 649 P.2d 1250 (1982); Neb.: Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 198 N.W.2d 57 (1972);
Nev.: Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp, 514 P.2d 654 (1973); N.H.: American Home
Improvement v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); NJ.: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); N.M.: Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675 (1985); N.Y.: Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA
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herding, the movement toward unconscionability exhibited some weak
geographic diffusion characteristics, beginning in the Northeastern and
New England states, and spreading to other states later.87
Does this evidence suggest that the doctrine of unconscionability is a
form of information cascade? It certainly may. Indeed, a number of early
decisions appear to cite other states' cases liberally, 8 indicating at least
some informational interdependence between jurisdictions. At the same
time, however, one of the largest difficulties one faces with rational herding
Land Dev. Corp., 344 N.E.2d 391 (1976); N.C.: Brenner v. Little Red Sch. House LTD, 274 S.E.2d 206
(1981); N.D.: Haugen v. Ford Motor Corp., 219 N.W.2d 462 (1974); Ohio: Lake Ridge Academy v.
Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183 (1993); Okla.: B.E. Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014 (1976); Or.: W.L.
May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (1975); Pa.: Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222
(1981); R.I.: Grady v. Grady, 504 A.2d 444 (1986); S.C.: Yet to adopt; S.D.: Johnson v. John Deere
Co., 306 N.W.2d 231 (1981); Tenn.: Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (1974); Tex.:
Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579 (1985); Utah: Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (1983);
Vt.: Lamoille Grain Co. v. St. Johnsbury, 369 A.2d 1389 (1976); Va.: Yet to adopt; Wash.: Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); D.C.: Williams v. Walker-Thomas Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); W. Va.: Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976); Wis.: Discount Fabric House v.
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984); Wyo.: In re Estate of Frederick, 599 P.2d 550 (1979).
87. The adoption of unconscionability does not seem to track closely with standard demographic
predictors outside of geography. A logistic regression of demographic variables of pre-1986 adoption
does not reveal a strong nongeographic element:

Variable
1980 Per Capita Income

1980Poertyj.,ate Southern State (dummy)
1980 Co"leeg

Constant

reeRate

Coefficient

StandardError

t-statistic

-. 00024

.00037

-.64817

12830

.89121

-1.48058

.91535

-1.61751f

2315

.19211,

1.31770

1434-

-.65504

.

4.26831
-.15347
* p<0.10;** p<.05
(50 states & District of Columbia)

N = 51
Source for Demographic data: U.S. Statistical Abstract (1995).
The only independent variable showing statistical significance is membership in southern states,
it being weakly predictive of a failure to adopt. The qualitative results reported above persist with a
number of other permutations in the model (in which one or more of the independent variables are
excluded). Moreover, the demographic variables in the specification above do not have a statistically
significant joint effect on pre-1986 adoption. x 2 (46) = 47.346; p=0.417. The apparent lack of strong
demographically-oriented diffusion as an empirical matter accords with similar findings with regard to
other doctrines. See, e.g., Canon & Braum, supra note 83, at 983-84 (noting similar evidence for
geographic diffusion in tort law). But see James M. Lutz, Regional Leaders in the Diffusion of Tort
Innovations Among the American States, 27 PuBLIUS 39 (1997) (arguing that there is some evidence of
required leadership in judicial innovation).
88. Of the adopting states listed in note 86 supra,over three-quarters cite to either Henningsenv.
Bloomfield Motors or Williams v. Walker-Thomas Co., as persuasive authority.
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models is that their causal triggers are difficult to verify empirically in the
face of other plausible hypotheses. For example, it may be that a detected
trend toward conformity is an artifact of some population-wide
informational "shock" eliciting rapid cross-sectional adjustment, but one
that outsiders might fail to measure or detect. Indeed, the timing of many
of the "watershed" unconscionability cases (such as Williams v. Walker89
Thomas Furniture
) coincided with the publication of numerous highprofile empirical studies of poverty in the United States-tending to
suggest that the relative plight of the American poor was worse than many
had thought.90 The timing also coincided with the arrival of a number of
Left-Democrat-appointed and elected judges, many of whom would likely
be favorably disposed to distributionally-minded doctrines, and
unconvinced by the holdings of more conservative judges that preceded
them. 91 These alternative phenomena are neither byproducts nor causes of
cascades, but either could just as easily give rise to the trend toward
conformity noted above.
This statistical identification problem is significant, particularly for
those interested in normative legal reform. Indeed, it may be both risky
and imprudent to advocate significant reform measures on the basis of
empirical observations that lend support to any number of plausible
interpretations, only some of which are cause for alarm. A sincere belief in
the prevalence of cascades is probably insufficient. Moreover, while the
discussion above is limited to a particular doctrinal candidate for
precedential cascades (that is, the unconscionability doctrine), the
verification problem is more general: Because herding phenomena are the
handiwork of information asymmetries that cannot be directly observed by
a statistician, it becomes extremely difficult to demonstrate that a herding
hypothesis is empirically more likely than any other plausible alternative,
which is itself either difficult to observe or has been erroneously excluded
from the analysis. Consequently, most attempts to verify the existence of
92
herding effects in empirical data are subject to extreme hazards.
Although empirical data seems unlikely to provide uncontroverted
proof of the prevalence of legal cascades, it may be possible to use
89.

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

90.

Of particular importance was the work of Michael Harrington. See generally MICHEAL

HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
91.
Indeed, Skelly Wright, the author of Williams v. Walker-Thomas, was himself a Democratic
appointee (Truman) to the federal bench, having been elevated to the D.C. circuit by President Kennedy

in 1962.
92. Matters may be different with experimental data, however, where the environmental factors
at play may be controlled.
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anecdotal evidence to suggest that cascade effects may have occurred in
some isolated situations. Unlike the aggregated statistical approach above,
an anecdotal approach places greater emphasis on determining whether a
series of judicial opinions constituting a possible cascade reflects (1) an
understanding of precedent as a reflection of judicial learning and (2) an
unsubstantiated confidence in that inherited learning that tends to quell
critical analysis of the instant facts in a case before the judge.
A few champions of cascade theory have offered anecdotal examples
of possible episodes of judicial herding. Andrew Daughety and Jennifer
Reinganum, for instance, posit that a series of six similarly-situated
opinions in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh circuits
preceding the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Eastern Enterprisesv.
Apfee93 might have constituted a precedential cascade.94 Each of the
appellate level cases upholds the constitutionality of a basic provision in
the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, in the face of both
takings and due process challenges. 95 Moreover, the series of cases
appears to satisfy both of the above criteria. Each cites to all its
predecessors for persuasive authority, and the opinions appear to become
more abbreviated. Indeed, by the time Eastern Enterprises is litigated in
1997, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "The constitutional
arguments [by the appellants challenging the Coal Act] are retreads which
have taken their lumps from circuit courts of appeals in five other circuits,"
and "[a]lthough these decisions are not binding on us, we find them
96
convincing."
Do the cases that precede Eastern Enterprises constitute a horizontal
cascade? If so, is it something we should be concerned about? Both of
these are difficult questions to answer. As to the first, it is true that each of
the cases cited to its predecessors for support. However, none are lacking
in long and even protracted analysis. (The First Circuit's opinion in
Eastern Enterprises, for example, is nearly thirteen two-column pages
long). Moreover, one can find examples in each case of factual analysis
that belies a herding hypothesis. In a number of cases, the written opinions
93.

524 U.S. 498 (1998).

94.

See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 10,at 5-7.

95. See Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (Ist Cir. 1997); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
Shalala, 79 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1996); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 (7th Cir. 1996); Holland v.
Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688
(3d Cir. 1996); Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 47 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1995); Chateaugay
Corp. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 977 F. Supp. 717 (W.D.
Pa. 1997); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 889 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa 1995).
96. Eastern Enters., 110 F.3d at 152.
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delve much further into the existing case law than a simple catalog of
previous holdings, often distinguishing contrary authority on the basis of
distinct facts.9 7 As noted above, a precondition for a cascade is that such
facts cannot be communicated among judges outside of their rule-bound
holdings. As to the second question, even if one were convinced that the
cases described represent a type of judicial cascade, there may be little
cause for alarm. Indeed, within three years of the initial appellate court
opinion on the issue, the Supreme Court (arguably in possession of a more
accurate signal) struck down the regulation as unconstitutional.9 8 As noted
above, the possibility of an appeals process tends to mitigate the severity of
a precedential cascade-and in this case it appears to have worked as
designed.
It goes without saying that legal discourse often revolves around the
distinct effects of "landmark" cases, which can, in turn, create a landslide
of similar holdings. Such cases have had a perceived effect of "locking in"
subsequent courts on the issue involved. Perhaps as a result, considerable
hand-wringing tends to permeate these areas of law over whether such
cases represent the "right" normative trajectory. However, in the absence
of a reliable mechanism for diagnosing and verifying whether such strands
of case law constitute bad precedential cascades, it is perhaps most prudent
to approach legal reform proposals purporting to ameliorate such problems
with significant caution. Failure to do so may give rise to even more severe
lapses of judgment.
IV. WHAT REMAINS?
The previous Sections of this Article have argued that although
precedential cascades are theoretically possible, their occurrence seems
implausible under current judicial practices and probably unverifiable with
observable data. Notably, my analysis has thus far avoided the question of
whether-in light of these arguments-a cascade theory of precedent
contributes anything to legal theory. It is to that question that I now attend.
Although the criticisms articulated above are strong ones, it does not
necessarily follow that the cascades literature is irrelevant for legal theory,
at least within a properly-specified domain. In particular, there are at least
three distinct ways in which cascades can be of tremendous assistance to
legal scholars, legal reformers, and judges. First, a cascade theory of
97. See, e.g., id. at 161 n.8 ("Finally, Unity Real Estate, on its facts, see 889 F. Supp. at 829-3 1,
is easily distinguishable from the case at bar.").

98.

See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 498.
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precedent (as described above) may provide a positive account of many
existing legal institutions as cascade-preventing devices. Second, an
awareness of the potential dangers of cascades can provide an important
(though perhaps limited) normative compass, both in evaluating legal
reform proposals, and in understanding group conformity among
populations that the law regulates. And finally, the criticisms raised above
help locate and sharpen the diagnostic debate over the dangers of judicial
conformity: for if the likelihood of information cascades among judges is
small, then the most serious dangers of conformity (if any) must emanate
from other, non-information-based accounts of herd-like behavior. I shall
briefly address each in turn.
A. CASCADES AND PosmvE ANALYSIS
Even if the incidence of a precedential cascade seems unlikely given
current judicial practices, its theoretical possibility may nonetheless hold
important implications for positive theories of law. In particular, the
lurking specter of information cascades may help us to better understand
and appreciate existing judicial institutions that work to attenuate such
dangers. Institutional practices that may appear wasteful or redundant to
the untrained eye may in actuality serve as valuable anti-cascade devices.
As noted in Part II, the practice of written opinions, the hierarchical appeals
process, the length of judicial tenures, the heterogeneity of the judiciary
(which long tenure facilitates), and the availability of standards and finetuned rules all tend to minimize the likelihood of a precedential cascade.
And while such practices probably did not come about because of concerns
over cascades, the durability of these institutions may well be an indication
of their effectiveness in preventing herding.
Consider, for example, the judicial practice of justifying decisions
with written opinions, which began in the United States a little over two
The anti-herding effects of the written opinion
centuries ago. 99
requirement are powerful ones, consisting of two separate components.
First, the writing requirement effectively forces a judge first to collect and
synthesize the pertinent facts of the case before her. If not otherwise
99.

In 1785, Connecticut became the first state to require written opinions by judges. See ERWvIN

C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 42 (1990); CHARLES WARREN,

A HISTORY

OF THE AMERICAN BAR 328 (1911). Although the practice eventually became universal, the diffusion
of the written opinion requirement was relatively slow (an interesting non-characteristic of a cascade).
Indeed, by 1815, only six states published official court reporters, limiting their publication only to
appellate courts. Towards the end of the 19th Century, however, written opinions had become the
norm. See Surrency, supraat 42-43.
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required to do so, a judge caught within a cascade would no doubt realize
that her decision in the instant case would not turn on any observations
about that case, and she might therefore have little incentive to collect and
process them. 100 The written opinion norm helps counteract this adverse
incentive, effectively making collection of information compatible with the
judge's incentives regardless of whether it would ultimately change her
view. Second, the act of writing an opinion compels each judge to pass on
the content of her observation (and interpretations thereof) to successors,
even if (once again) these observations are insufficient to overcome the
weight of preceding decisions. Such serial communication (if done
truthfully' 0 1) ensures that each judge contributes to the public inventory of
knowledge for future judges, increasing the likelihood that the system can
break out of an imprudent cascade at some later date.
In a similar vein, a cascade theory of precedent may shed light on the
constraints that many jurisdictions place on when a prior opinion can
constitute authority. Most federal jurisdictions, for instance, do not accord
unpublished (or de-published) opinions any precedential weight
whatsoever, and forbid litigants from citing such opinions in written or oral
argument. 10 2 Such a rule comports well with one's anti-herding intuitions:
As noted in Part II, the dangers of cascades are greatest when succeeding
actors observe only a noisy signal of their predecessors' actions and
information (such as the outcome alone). Consequently, the dangers of
undesirable cascades are minimized when either (i) successors have nearlycomplete access to such information, or (ii) they have no information
whatsoever. As a general matter, opinions that remain unpublished are
typically much less nuanced and rigorous than are their published
100. As noted at note 87 supra, a cascade can still emerge even when the signals of predecessors
are observable, so long as the decision about whether to observe the signal is endogenous.
101. In the example analyzed in Part II, truthful revelation in a written opinion is perfectly
consistent with equilibrium play. Outside of information cascade environments, however (such as

reputational conformism, discussed in Part IV.C infra), truthful opinions may be less plausible.
102. Among federal cireuits, those prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions include the First,
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See 1ST CR. R. 36.2(b)(6); 2D 0R. R. 0.23; 7m" CR, R.

53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH Cm. R. 36-3; D.C. CIR. R. 28(c). Similarly, the Third Circuit while not formally
prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions apparently adheres to an historical norm against such
practices. See 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROc. 5.8. (stating that the Circuit "historically has not
regarded unpublished opinions as precedents that bind the court," and therefore "the court by tradition

does not cite to its unpublished opinions as authority").
For greater elaboration of the federal circuit-court rules on nonpublication and noncitation, see
Martha J. Dragich, Will the FederalCourts of Appeals Perishif They Publish? Or Does the Declining
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify JudicialDecisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
757, 761-62 & nn.12-17 (1995); Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The
Proliferationof Local Rules in the FederalCourts,68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1997).
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counterparts. 1 3 Consequently, the relative opacity of unpublished opinions
suggests that the herding dangers in using such opinions as authority are
potentially much more severe than with their published counterparts.
Absent a comprehensive, published opinion, the next best solution for
avoiding an undesirable cascade may simply be to disallow an unpublished
opinion from having any weight whatsoever, which is exactly the result
that nonpublication and noncitation rules (within at least most circuits"°4)
compel.
In addition to existing judicial practices already mentioned, the
information cascades literature adds interesting historical insights on past
jurisprudential protocols. For instance, up until the mid-twentieth century,
the United States Supreme Court employed an informal voting protocol
that had interesting cascade-dampening characteristics. During its regular
conferences while in session, the Court votes on (among other things) the
disposition of cases argued before it during the previous days. As
described by Justice Tom Clark in 1956, these votes traditionally had an
interesting counter-seniority flavor: "Ever since John Marshall's day, the
formal vote begins with the junior Justice and moves up through the ranks
of seniority, the Chief Justice voting last. Hence the juniors are not
influenced by the vote of their elders !" 105
If tenure on the bench proxies (even indirectly) for some measure of
"judicial expertise," then reverse-seniority rules such as that described by
Justice Clark would tend to reduce the dangers of herding effects among
the judges themselves. Indeed, under such a rule, the late-voting senior
Justices-armed with greater relative confidence in their own private
inclinations-might still follow their own inclinations rather than those
expressed by predecessors in action. Conversely, a conventional seniority
103. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publicationand No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,

1175 (1978).
104.

It is important to note that the federal circuits, while all disfavoring the citation of

unpublished opinions, have not been uniform in their policies towards that end. The Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have a formal policy that such opinions are not binding, but nonetheless authorize
citation of such opinions as "persuasive" authority. See 8TH CIR. R. 28A(k); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3; 11TH
CIR. R. 36-2. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits are similar, announcing that such citations are officially

"disfavored" but nonetheless permissible when the unpublished opinion "has precedential value in
relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve as well."
See 4TH CiR. R. 36(c); 6TH CIR. R. 10(f). Finally, the Fifth Circuit, while moving towards a policy of
disapprobation, still considers any unpublished opinions issued before 1996 to have precedential
authority (while those after 1996 carry persuasive authority). See 5TH CIR.R. 47.5.3-47.5.4.
105. Justice Tom Clark, The Supreme Court Conference, 19 F.R.D. 303, 306-07 (1956) (emphasis

in original).
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voting rule poses somewhat greater dangers of queue-taking by junior

Justices-who not only may be less confident in their independent
assessments of the matter, but also have relatively large reputation-building
concerns upon joining the court. Ironically, in the years since Justice Clark
penned his account of Supreme Court practice, the reverse-seniority
protocol has apparently fallen from use. 106 But whatever the reasons for
this development, 0 7 cascade theory embodies what was almost certainly at

the core of the original reverse-seniority voting norm (at least as Justice
Clark understood it).

B. CASCADES AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Beyond enriching our positive understanding of existing (and/or
historical) institutions, appreciating the possibility for precedential
106. Indeed, it appears the practice had already evolved into little more than institutional lore by
the early 1970s, as Justice Rehnquist writes:
For many years there has circulated a tale... that the voting begins with the junior justice and
proceeds back to the Chief Justice in order of seniority. I can testify that, at least during [my
tenure] on the Court, this tale is very much of a myth; I don't believe I have ever seen it
happen at any of the conferences I have attended.
WELLiAm REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 289-90 (1987).
107. A number of reasons are possible. One obvious candidate is that cascades are simply not a
significant danger when the vote is preceded by a period of discussion (as the case with such
conferences). It should be noted, however, that under current practices, the vote and the discussion are
essentially bundled together. See ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN & STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO,
SUPREME COURT PRACrIcE 230 (7th ed. 1993) (noting that under current practices, each Justice
customarily indicates his or her vote at the first opportunity to comment). Consequently, the only
formal discussion that the Chief Justice hears before casting his vote is essentially his own. A related
but slightly different theory is that a reverse-seniority voting rule is not likely to stem cascading
phenomena that have already begun in pre-vote deliberations. Indeed, even during Justice Clark's
tenure on the bench (as today), discussion of argued cases within conference sessions occurred
sequentially, in order of seniority starting with Chief Justice and ending with the most junior Associate
Justice. See id. at 6-7. Given that late contributors may have already distorted their expressed
viewpoints based on what more senior justices have said, the reverse-seniority protocol at a subsequent
voting stage may not present much of a safeguard against cascades. Yet a third possible reason that
reverse-voting protocols have not survived is the observation that increased workload on the Court has
caused it to streamline its procedures to save time, eliminating a separate stage of voting at the end. See
id. at 29-38. Finally, senior Justices may have strong personal incentives to foster a conventional
seniority norm, as reverse-seniority rules wrest some agenda-control powers from the top of the Court's
hierarchy. As a Justice moves up through the ranks of seniority, she or he may increasingly feel
uninterested in advocating an institutional protocol that disfavors senior members of the Court. See,
e.g., REHNQUIST, supranote 106, at 289 (describing his disappointment while an Associate Justice that
his judicial efforts were rarely heeded, as the outcome of a vote was already determined by the time his
opportunity to speak and vote arrived, and noting that as his tenure increased on the Court, he came to
realize that his preference for more of a round-table discussion was fine in the abstract, "but was
ultimately Adoomed by the seniority system to which the senior justices naturally adhere"). Accord
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay: Remarks for American Law Institute Annual Dinner, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J.
881 (1994) (relating the same story, but noting that one redeeming virtue of being the last voter is the
possibility of being the deciding vote in a 5-4 decision).
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cascades may also provide some limited normative guidance to judges in at
least two ways. First, even though existing organizational devices in the
judiciary tend to dampen the likelihood of cascades among judges, similar
institutional devices need not constrain the behavior of nonlegal actors. As
such, cascade theory can still be of enormous value in helping judges to
understand the populations they endeavor to regulate. It has been
suggested, for instance, that public assessments of catastrophic
environmental risks may be subject to cascade phenomena, which, if left
unchecked, can lead to equally catastrophic policy decisions. 10 8 Financial
markets may similarly be subject to herding behavior, leading to market
bubbles and concomitant panics or crashes.' 0 9 When a judge is attempting
to articulate legal rules to regulate such actors, she would be wise to assess
whether and to what extent herding dangers exist. When they are likely,
judges may be able to stem such events, by (inter alia) mandating the
public disclosure of information that might break a cascade, constraining
the behavior of those who might generate one, 110 or by effective oversight
of administrative agencies (who may themselves fall victim to such
phenomena)."'
Second, cascade theory can potentially provide a normative compass
(albeit a limited one) in assessing the prudence of other legal institutions
and/or proposals. In their influential book on the structure of judiciary, for
example, Sam Estreicher and John Sexton advocate a reform of the
Supreme Court's case selection criteria using a quasi-managerial model of
docketing."n Under this approach, the Supreme Court should privilege the
existence of persistent, inter-court conflict when making certiorari
decisions." 3 By negative corollary, of course, this proposal impels the
108. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10.
109. See, e.g., David Hirshleifer, Informational Cascades and Social Conventions, in THE NEw
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 301,305-06 (citing sources).
110. For instance, Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires corporate
fiduciaries and large-stake (10% or higher) shareholders to identify themselves to the SEC and report
any significant trades they make in the market for that security. Moreover, Section 16(b) requires such
insiders to disgorge to the issuer any "short-swing" profits to the issuer made within 6 months of a
purchase and sale of the proscribed security, thereby dampening their incentives to ignite a cascade (or
alternatively inducing them to disclose additional information to the market).
111. Kuran and Sunstein, for example, suggest that courts may be able to use their powers under
the Administrative Procedure Act to reverse "arbitrary and capricious" administrative regulations which
may be the product of a public risk-assessment cascade. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 75859.
112. SAMUEL EISTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 41-70

(1986).
113. To animate their reform proposal, Estreicher and Sexton analogize the job of the Supreme
Court to that of a manager who oversees a hierarchy of delegated decisionmakers:
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Court to place relatively little weight on areas of law where there is
complete or substantial harmony among competing circuits or state
1 14
supreme courts.
Significantly, the Estreicher-Sexton justification for privileging interjurisdictional conflicts is not merely academic: The Supreme Court's own
rules on certiorari make it clear that inter-jurisdictional conflict is a
principal guiding factor in reaching a decision:
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate
the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision
in conflict with a decision of another United States court of appeals
on the same matter; or has decided a federal question in a way in
conflict with a state court of last resort ....
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question
in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last
115
resort or a United States court of appeals.
The "if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it" rationale that lies at the core of the

inter-jurisdictional conflict criterion certainly seems unobjectionable at first
glance. Indeed, the Supreme Court has limited resources, and can only
hear a fraction of appealed cases each year." 6 Thus, the Court would
certainly be well-advised to focus only on only those strands of case law in
which its intervention is seriously needed.117 The pivotal question remains,
however, whether inter-jurisdictional conflict provides a reliable diagnostic
proxy for such situations. A serious account of precedential cascades raises
the possibility that such a criterion is severely under-inclusive. In

particular, if judges within sister jurisdictions viewed one another's
opinions as potentially persuasive authority, cross-jurisdictional uniformity
A wise manager delegates responsibilities to subordinates and, when there is no indication
that something is awry, does not intervene. To do otherwise is to denigrate the authority of
subordinate actors, diminishing their own sense of responsibility and ultimately increasing the
manager's tasks as well as the overall workload. The Supreme Court as manager would trust
the subordinate actors in the judicial system, intervening only when some structural signal
(such as a persistentconflict between subordinates)indicatesa problem requiringcorrection.
Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
114. Indeed, Estreicher and Sexton label as "improvident" the granting of certiorari to areas of law
in where only two or fewer lower courts are in doctrinal conflict. See id.
115. Sup. Cr.R. 10.
116. See STERNTErAL., supranote 107, at 29-38.
117. A similar argument may well hold true for appellate-level courts, which, while necessarily
taking on all appeals, may decide on the degree of intensity with which they review.
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might mask an underlying cascade-and with it, stagnated judicial learning
and possibly serious errors in policy. In contrast, areas of case law in
which there is significant inter-jurisdictional division might actually
portend good news (at least in some cases), as it indicates that dynamic
judicial learning may still be vibrant and ongoing. Hence, rational-herding
considerations may conflate considerably one's normative assessment of
118
the intra-jurisdictional conflict criterion.
It is, however, important to remain mindful of a limiting caveat to
such normative arguments: the aforementioned difficulty in empirically
verifying cascades 119 would almost surely confound the Court's attempts to
distinguish (a) the uniformity produced by cascades, and (b) that produced
by more generic intra-jurisdictional harmony. Although the Court might
attempt to marshal some set of prescriptive considerations (for example, the
degree to which various opinions cite one another, the relative opacity in
the opinions, or the degree to which prudent policy turns on information
learned through the cases' 20 ), it could never be completely sure that its
intervention in a particular strand of cases has positive net value. But by
the same token, the very difficulty in proving the existence of cascades also
implicates the task of proving their absence. As such, the potential danger
of disguised uniformity should perhaps play at least some role in case
selection, and even an occasional, seemingly improvident review may be
justifiable given the possible costs of imprudent precedential herding.

C. NON-LEARNING-BASED SOURCES OF CONFORMISM
Finally, the arguments presented above may help to constrain and
focus the broader debate about whether precedent represents a dangerous

form of group herding. While information cascades may not be a plausible
source of judicial conformity, they are but one positive account of
conformity. Although a comprehensive analysis of alternative accounts is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is perhaps worthwhile to take up briefly

two such possibilities: (a) reputational concerns, and (b) the role of
118. To be sure, there may be other reasons (not related to cascades) for courts to close up interjurisdictional disagreements (at least eventually). At some point the value of uniformity and
predictability in law likely surpasses the value of additional fine-tuning. Viewed in this sense, it may
well be prudent for the Court to step in and resolve inter-jurisdictional conflict after sufficient
percolation. Nevertheless, the point remains that if the Court is also interested in attenuating
precedential cascades, such a criterion is almost surely under-inclusive.
119. See Part III, supra notes 79-98.
120. See, e.g., Daughety & Reinganum, supranote 10.
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cognitive biases towards conformity. 2 ' Both of these phenomena deserve
consideration as possible independent sources of dangerous herding
behavior. But at the same time, a number of open questions remain as to
the independent power and plausibility of these alternative hypotheses on
their own terms.
First, individual judges may refuse to break rank with their
predecessors because of a reputationalstake in conforming, perhaps for
fear of subjecting their own preferences or intellectual shortcomings to
public scrutiny should they break with the herd. A judge may, for example,
have a large stake in bolstering her standing within some public
constituency, and might therefore be inclined to issue holdings that favor
that group regardless of her own inclinations.12 2 Alternatively, a judge may
fear that he is not as skilled as his predecessors, and may therefore attempt
to "hide" within existing precedent, believing that if the policy it represents
is eventually exposed as improvident, it is much better to fail within a
group than to do so alone. 12 3 Over time, these reputational concerns may
give rise to a stable precedent, but one that is not justified on the basis of
sequential learning.
Reputational stories such as this are potentially quite powerful, and
therefore warrant attention from those interested in the formation and
durability of judicial conformity. Such accounts, however, inevitably must
confront many of the same shortcomings that rendered standard
information cascades somewhat implausible. For instance, the degree to
which a judge is beholden to a particular constituency seems much
diminished when that judge enjoys life tenure (as do most federal Article
ImI judges and some state supreme court judges). In fact, as one moves
through the appeals process (and in the limit to the U.S. Supreme Court),
the constituency-serving proclivities of those on the bench likely recede
even further. Thus, even if reputational herding occurs within the lower
121. Omitted from the textual discussion, but nonetheless relevant, are so-called network effects,
in which individuals' payoffs from adhering to a given practice increases with the population of others
who adhere to the same practice. Of particular relevance here are computer programs and hardware,
telephones, and trade practices. See supra cites at note 13. The role of network effects is helpful in
understanding why some conformity trends may eventually become stable, but it tells us little about
how or why the initial convention starts, and why at its nascent stages players would want to conform
with one another. The alternative theories presented in the previous section and below attempt to offer
such a theory, while network effects do not.
122. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 727-30. See also generally TIMR KURAN, PRIVATE
TRUTHs, PUBUIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995).
123. See Zwiebel, supranote 12; Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 12.
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echelons of the judiciary, the appeals process itself may be a particularly
good institutional response to such dangers.
Moreover, the sorts of equilibria that come from reputational attempts
to hide quality differences are subtle, and need not always entail group
conformity. In one well-known application of reputational herding to
corporate managers, for example, Jeff Zwiebel argues that extremely highquality managers are likely to break with convention and opt for riskier but
more profitable projects. 24 In fact, his analysis predicts that an extremely
low-quality manager will also tend to break from convention, hoping
against hope that a successful outcome may lead outside observers to
reassess his quality, thereby prolonging his career. In the context of legal
precedent, a similar outcome might occur, in which very high or very low
quality judges are willing to break with current law precisely because of
reputational concerns. Thus, just as with information cascade models,
heterogeneity among the actors in a reputational model can quite plausibly
reduce (rather than enhance) a trend towards conformity.
Another strand of behavioral hypotheses that can lead to precedentlike conformity comes from the field of cognitive psychology. For many
years, experimental psychologists have made significant contributions to
social science by demonstrating that individuals often deviate in important
ways from rational behavior in environments of risk or uncertainty.
Sometimes these deviations are severe, and undoubtedly implicate
important policy concerns when they occur outside of the laboratory.
Indeed, Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein have recently posited that one such
behavioral pathology-known125as the "availability heuristic"-may lend
itself to cascade-like behavior.
The availability heuristic is a cognitive bias in the way people infer
the probability of some event from their own experiential observations
about how frequently it occurs. At its core, the heuristic asserts that one's
empirical recollections (which comprise her statistical "sample") will be
skewed towards particularly memorable or vivid examples, giving
relatively short Bayesian shrift to more mundane-but perhaps more
representative-occurrences. 126 As applied to precedent, the availability
bias might induce judges to place excessive decisional weight on a few
well-remembered holdings (such as those involving particularly recent
124.

See Zwiebel, supranote 12.

125. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10.
126. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCi. 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Avalability: A Heuristicfor Judging
Frequencyand Probability,4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
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disputes, or prominent litigants or judges) when forming their estimations
of sound legal policy. By placing such great emphasis on a relatively
modest sample, the judge may well decide to follow the precedent from
those cases even if the majority of less vivid cases came out the other way.
While certainly pertinent and worthy of investigation, the availability
heuristic faces at least three challenges if it is to carry the weight of a
cascade theory of precedent. First, it may just as plausibly work against a
norm of precedent than for it. For instance, in deciding whether to follow
precedent and impose a mandatory life prison term on a convicted criminal
defendant, a judge may systematically recall only the most vivid instances
in which such defendants were much later shown to be innocent (even if
most sentences are handed down appropriately). 2 7 Alternatively, she may
selectively recall only those cases that she personally adjudicates, since
those are the only ones whose facts are particularly vivid for her. Once
again, such behavior could tend to dampen-not encourage-mutual
emulation among judges.
Second, the availability heuristic is but one of a vast array of
nonrational cognitive biases identified within prospect theory. Other biases
may be equally plausible, yet work at cross purposes with the availability
heuristic. Consider, for example, the so-called "representativeness"
heuristic, which posits that when analyzing a population sample to choose
between two hypotheses about that population, decision makers tend to
ignore a priori information they inherit about base-rate probabilities of the
two hypotheses. In the context of the example from Part II, this implies
that a judge's choice between the two relevant hypotheses (that is, whether
most of the population consists of low-cost or high-cost victims) would
turn predominantly on the observed cost of the victim in the case before
her, placing little weight on the information that prior holdings might
convey about the population in general. Once again, such a tendency

appears to mitigate (rather than exacerbate) the dangers of undesirable
cascades.
Similarly, the oft-studied cognitive phenomenon of overconfidence
may also have cascade-dampening effects.
Psychologists have
demonstrated that a vast majority of people rate themselves as more
intellectually gifted than others, better drivers than the average person, 128
127. An identical argument would apply, of course, if the received precedent were relatively
lenient, as the judge might vividly recall the few instances of a culpable defendant who was released

early and proceeded to commit more crimes.
128. See, respectively, 2 R.C. WYLIE, THE SELF-CONCEPT (1979); 0. Svenson, Are We All Less
Risky and More Skillful Than OurFellow Drivers?,47 AcTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981).
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129
and less likely than the average person to fall victim to a fatal disease.

Newlyweds generally estimate correctly that approximately half of all
married couples eventually divorce, but at the same time assess their own
chances for divorce to be zero. 130 Such "Lake Wobegon" effects appear to
implicate the judgment of professionals and entrepreneurs as well, and
transcend a number of other demographic profiles. 13 1 It would seem to be
particularly salient among judges as well, who are often (but not always)
selected for the job on the basis of their demonstrated skills as high-profile
lawyers or professors. 132 The possible dampening effect of overconfidence
on the formation of precedential cascades is therefore apparent:

Overconfidence induces the marginal actor to discount (rather than inflate)
the relative decisionmaking skills of her counterparts, thereby inducing her
to be less inclined to follow the precedents established by those perceived
133
to be less talented actors than herself.

Finally, the possibility that precedent arises through noninformation-based cascades does not ease the burden of verifying whether
such conformity is caused by such possibilities, or rather by other factors

that simply are not observed by the statistician. In fact, cognitive accounts
may be similarly prone to verifiability problems outside the laboratory, as
most of our current stock of knowledge consists more of a set of controlled
134
experimental results than it does a unified, robust theory of behavior.
129. See N. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J.
BEHAV. MED. 441 (1982). This sort of over-optimism would also appear to implicate how people react
to public health crises, and might therefore tend to counteract the sort of public scare phenomena
described in Kuran & Sunstein, supranote 10.
130. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptionsand Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 439, 443
(1993).
131. Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processesfor Low Probability Events:
Policy Implications, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 569 (1989); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic
BiasesAbout PersonalRisks, 246 Scd. 1232, 1232 (1989). The label "Lake Wobegon effect' refers to
Garrison Keifor's mythical city on the Prarie Home Companion radio show "a city where "the women
are strong, the men are good looking, and all the children are above average."
132. It has often been noted that the legal profession is one of the most salient examples of socalled "winner-take-all" markets, which tend to be inhabited by habitually overconfident individuals.
See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK & PHIIP COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 16-17, 97-98
(documenting this feature within the legal profession).
133. See, e.g., Antonio Bemardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and
Entreprenuers (UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management Working Paper #9-97, 1998)
(arguing that overconfidence among a segment of a population can have beneficial herd-breaking
effects).
134. See Jennifer Arlen, The Future of BehavioralEconomic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1765, 1787-88 (1998) (noting that in spite of its attraction, prospect theory has yet to offer a coherent,
robust alternative paradigm to the admittedly-flawed rational choice paradigm).
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And while this does not mean that such accounts are "wrong," it does
suggest that more work lay ahead.
As the discussion above demonstrates, reputational and cognitive
phenomena potentially play a role in animating a more textured and general
account of precedent as a form of herding behavior. If, however,
information cascades can play no more than a modest role in such an
account (as I have argued in previous sections), these alternative
hypotheses must carry greater proportional weight, and must do so amid
their own plausibility challenges. Whether they can support the weight of
the argument remains to be seen, but is nonetheless worthy of future
exploration.
CONCLUSION
Cascades and herding behavior have become increasingly popular
tropes among legal academics in recent years.' 35 This trend is hardly
surprising: Traditional rational actor models are almost certainly an
incomplete account of individual behavior in practice, and have had only
moderate success in predicting group behavior. Models of cascade
behavior offer an attractive explanation of how groups of individuals may
be prone to severe lapses of judgment-lapses which may well be
magnified later by other well-documented behavioral pathologies. Whether
such phenomena help explain formation and stability of judicial precedent
is an interesting and important question. Nevertheless, as the arguments
presented above suggest, it seems unlikely that information cascades
present a significant impediment to the judiciary. At present, then, the
cascades literature does not provide general and robust description of legal
evolution.
This does not mean, however, that considerations of herding behavior
are wholly irrelevant to advance our theory of judging and judges. Indeed,
a cascade theory of precedent lends considerable justification to a number
of existing organizational features of the judiciary as cascade-preventing
devices, such as life tenure, written opinions, stacked hierarchies, and the
frequent preference for judicial casuistry over hard-and-fast rules.
Moreover, cascade theory can still be of enormous value in helping judges
to understand the populations they endeavor to regulate-populations that
are not themselves governed by the same cascade-dampening institutions
that protect the judiciary. Additionally, awareness of the possibility of
135. A recent LEXIS search found well over 100 published law review articles that refer to either
"herding behavior" or "information cascades" or both since 1992.
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cascades may provide at least a small amount of normative guidance in
evaluating the optimal design of other institutions, such as the Supreme
Court's method of selecting cases for review.
And finally, the
implausibility of precedential cascades nonetheless helps focus and refine
future debate around alternative non-informational theories of dangerous
judicial conformity. Although these alternative theories face plausibility
and verifiability challenges of their own, the enterprise of exploring them
clearly warrants our cautious attention.1 36 Legal scholars, judges, and
practitioners would be wise to heed the lessons from the cascades literature
in considering the role of precedent. 137 But in so doing, it is important to
be sure that it is not we-as opposed to those we study-who are the ones
caught within a cascade.

APPENDIX
This Appendix contains a more formal analysis of some of the central
intuitions developed in the body of the paper. I employ the following
notation:
J=
c

Judge in period i
=

x=
c+ d(x)

Signal received by J about victim (1 if high-cost,
0 if else)
=

Y=
0

Injurer's cost of avoidance (constant for all
injurers)

Randomly-drawn victim's cost of avoidance
(d(1) = D > 0 if victim is high-cost, and d(O) =
-D < 0 if victim is low-cost)
J,'s announced holding (1 if pro-victim, 0 if proinjurer)

=

True proportion of high-cost victims (constant
over time)

136. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10. Moreover, if one wishes to make a case for
cascades solely on cognitive grounds, it is still necessary to test the hypothesis of a herding effect
against other plausible hypotheses that would lead to unified group behavior (see above), and to account
for other plausible cognitive pathologies that tend to diminish (rather than amplify) the likelihood of a
cascade. See, e.g., Bernardo & Welch, supranote 133.
137. Contract interpretation doctrine, for instance, often hinges on established trade custom. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202.
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The following Lemma describes how an efficiency-minded judge will
behave with a given inherited history and given observation. This Lemma
applies regardless of whether each judge has access to no history, only a set
of holdings, or a set of holdings and reasonings.
Lemma 1: The marginal judge i facing history h, and observing facts x,
strictly prefers holding y, = 1 over y, = 0 ifffO I X ,h, ) dominates thef(1-e I
X ,h, ) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Given history h and observing facts x, J, strictly prefers
holding y,= 1 to y,= 0 whenever the expected precaution costs are lower for
y,= 1 than for y,= 0. Equivalently, J, prefers holding y,= 1 when:
I

c<f [(c+D).O + (c-D).(1-O)] dF(O/x,h)
0
Which, after simplification, is equivalent to:

f

(0,)<f

) dF((1-0)/x,,h)

0

0

The above expression will always be satisfied under first-order
stochastic dominance; that is, F(O I X,,h )<F(1-O I X ,h1 ) for all OE [0,1].
Using Lemma 1, it is possible to derive the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Suppose a judge had access neither to previous
holdings nor to the private signals of previous judges (that is, h,=[O)), J.
will holdy, = 1 if and only if x,= 1.
Proof. "If": Under myopia, where h, = {0}, every judge J, is in the
identical position as J,. Thus, one need only demonstrate that J, will hold
y = 1 if and only if she receives a signal of x, = 1. Suppose J1 does receive
such a signal. The resulting posterior density she places on 0 (recalling the
uniform prior) will then be:

f (O / X1 =

1

)-- Pr{X
I 1 =1

e.f(O) -I

fPrtX,=l /e].do
0

e

f
0

=20

odo
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Note thatf(1-O I x, = 1) = 2[1-0], and thusftO I x, = 1) must crossf(10 Ix, =1) once from below. Consequently, F(1-O I x, = 1) > F(O I x, = 1).
"Only if": assume the judge receives a signal of X = 0. It is easily shown
that the posterior distribution on j(O I x, = 0) = 2[1-0]. The rest of the
proof proceeds in an identical fashion as that above.
Proposition 2: Suppose instead that judge J, has access to both
previous holdings and the factual record that drove those opinions (that is,
h, = [y, y 2, y ... y,,; x,, x2, x, .. , x j. Judge J, will prefer y, = 1 (y, = 0)
whenever the total number of x = 1 signals exceeds than (is less than) the
number of x = 0 signals.
Proof.Note first that if J, has access to the factual records, she has all
relevant information and may disregard the actual holdings of her
predecessors. Define no as the number of x = 0 signals and n, as the number
of x = 1 signals received up to and including x,. The posterior distribution
of 0 given no and n, is given by Bayes rule as follows:
Pr{no,nl O}J.f (0)
f (0 n0,n

I

(1-0)"°.on

1
JPrfnonz
o
-

IO}.dO

f(1-oP.6'dO

0
(fo+fl,+l)! .(i_09).o.0n,
-- noint!

From the above expressions it is clear that f(6 I no , n1) > f(l-0 I no , n1)
whenever

This implies that when n, > no, f(0 I no , n1) crosses f(1-0 I no, n) from
below but one time, and satisfies the single crossing property for
probability density functions. 138 This ordering is reversed whenever n, >
no. As such, F(O I no , n) dominates F(1-0 I n o , n) in the first order
stochastic sense whenever n, > n0, and vice versa.
Finally, consider the case in which judges only have access to prior
holdings, but not prior opinions.
Proposition 3: Suppose historical holdings are opaque (i.e., h, =
Define n o as the number of y = 0 holdings and n, as the
(y,,y 2,y,,. .,.j).
138. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380 (1981).
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number of y = 1 holdings through stage i. At the first stage i in which n, _
n,+2 (no > n,+2), then for all j i, yj = 1 (yj = 0), regardlessof x,.
Proof.Suppose that i is even, and that for every stage k < (i-2), 1no-n,1
< 2. This implies that at stage i-2, no = n,. Because (by assumption) a
cascade has yet to occur, the sequence (y,y2,y,. . .y,.] perfectly reveals the
content of the signals (x,,x,x,. .. xJ: half (i-2)/2 courts received signal x=0
and half (i-2)/2 received signal x = 1.
Without loss of generality, suppose that y,., = y, = 1.139 By the same
argument as above, y-, = I reveals that x,., = 1. However, the fact that y, =
1 could reveal that x = 1, or it could reveal that x, = 0 and that J,
randomized between y, = 1 and y, = 0 with respective probabilities [a, 1-d]
(with y, = 1 being the realization of that randomization process). As such,
y, = 1 would occur with probability 0 + (1-0)(x.
Now, suppose that in addition to this historical vector of holdings, Jr,
receives the signal, xu. To demonstrate the above proposition, it is
sufficient to show that y, = 1 even when x.,4 = 0.140 Thus, suppose xl+ = 0.
s posterior density on 0 is given by:

2

[0+(1-0)a].(i
f (0 / hi, x+1=O)= iOi2d'
f [0+(1-0)a].(1-Oy'2 d' 2 d 0
0

=Kj.'[ +(1_-O) a].'(1_-O)12 d12,
where K is a constant. 14 1 Using the expression above, it is easily verified
thatf(01h, x = 0) <J(1-OIhz x = 0) if and only if 0 < 1/2, thereby satisfying
the single crossing property. 142 As such, 0 dominates (1-0) in the sense of
first order stochastic dominance. Importantly, once this condition is
139.

The case ofy,, = y, = 0 is identical, and is therefore ignored.

140.

Certainly, if one can show this result, then it is straightforward to show the weaker result that

y. = 1 ifx,,= 1.
141. Explicitly, I is given by:

2

i+2

(1 a)
142.

1 3
'(2-+-)

i.(21

See Milgmm, supra note 138.
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137

verified for J, J cannot infer anything from y,, and is therefore in the
same position as y,. Thus, for any even i, the proposition has been shown.
If i is odd, then it cannot be the case that n, > no+2 unless this was also
true for J,., The argument above establishes that J ., must have been in a
cascade, and by stationarity it is established for J as well.

